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The Financial Stress Index: Identification of Systemic Risk Conditions 
1. Introduction 
In every systematic inquiry (methodos) where there are first principles, or causes, 
or elements, knowledge and science result from acquiring knowledge of these; for 
we think we know something just in case we acquire knowledge of the primary 
causes, the primary first principles, all the way to the elements. It is clear, then, 
that in the science of nature as elsewhere, we should try first to determine 
questions about the first principles. The naturally proper direction of our road is 
from things better known and clearer to us, to things that are clearer and better 
known by nature; for the things known to us are not the same as the things known 
unconditionally (haplôs). Hence it is necessary for us to progress, following this 
procedure, from the things that are less clear by nature, but clearer to us, towards 
things that are clearer and better known by nature. 
——Aristotle, Phys. 184a10–21 
In this paper, we describe the design and features of the Cleveland Financial Stress Index 
(CFSI) series, originally constructed in early 2009. Reviewing precedents in the literature on 
identifying systemic distress conditions (section 2), we find that theoretical precedents focusing 
on crises provide insufficient identification for supervisory objectives. We introduce the concept 
of financial stress in section 2 and discuss CFSI construction in section 3. We show that CFSI 
adds a number of useful innovations to the literature on financial stress and conditions indexes.
6 
Clarity of construction is among the main contributions of the CFSI approach to alternative 
series. This clarity is reflected in CFSI’s key design features: modular construction; weighting 
methodology; and component market factors. 
Modular construction. CFSI’s construction is modular, with clear, tractable financial 
markets. This allows modular expansion in response to the emergence and availability of 
important new financial markets. 
Weighting methodology. The selection of weighting methodology maintains the clarity of 
CFSI’s construction. In contrast to alternative recent indexes, excepting Illing and Liu, we do not 
                                                            
6   In 2009, the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland’s financial stress series was the only choice for developing the 
SAFE EWS. By the end of 2010, 12 alternative financial stress indexes existed. 4 
 
pre-select a weighting methodology. Proceeding from first principles, we are skeptical of making 
a priori choices of indexing method; instead, we test several alternatives. In this, we extend Illing 
and Liu’s exploration of various construction approaches.
7 Section 4 discusses the selection and 
results of CFSI’s weighting method and describes the testing process. 
Component market factors. We correct certain inconsistencies in the Illing and Liu 
construction method and introduce several observable-component market factors that describe 
new dimensions of stress in the financial markets (section 3). 
The CFSI benchmarking process described in section 4 makes four innovative contributions 
to the literature. The researcher, having established a measure of financial stress, must be able to 
support the claim that it is dependable and free from specification problems, such as incorrect 
functional form, omission of relevant explanatory variables, inclusion of redundant variables, 
etc. Our first contribution to the literature is an innovative, objective method for verifying and 
benchmarking financial stress. To benchmark financial stress, the method utilizes the related 
concept of financial risk as volatility. General volatility indexes, which are readily available in 
most financial markets, represent aggregate measures of market volatility and usually mix 
financial and nonfinancial firms. The CFSI benchmarking process establishes a set of 
independent market volatility benchmarks to verify the performance of the CFSI’s measure of 
financial stress. Our second contribution is the use of volatility benchmarks for dating episodes 
of systemic stress. Our third is the operational definition of systemic risk, which allows 
implementation of stress-episode dating. Our fourth is a demonstration of the benchmarking 
method in an expanded interpretation of past U.S. financial episodes and an objective assessment 
of current observations. Section 4 shows that the construction method for CSFI is optimal under 
a variety of monitoring cycles that range from weekly to quarterly. 
In section 5, which describes our results, we discuss the dependability, robustness, and 
decomposition of CFSI. We show that with a quarterly series, CFSI dependably filters out 
idiosyncratic stress episodes, which makes it useful as a dependent variable in a systemic risk 
EWS. We consider CFSI’s time series properties and establish the stationarity of the quarterly 
series, which is particularly important in the context of a EWS. We then establish a dynamic 
                                                            
7  In explaining the financial stress index for Canada, Illing and Liu established the weighting-method selection 
process as a paradigm of search that minimized selection bias among the weighting methods. We are skeptical 
about several recent papers on index construction that discuss only one weighting method and offer no support 
for minimizing selection bias. 5 
 
benchmark model for forecasts of systemic risk conditions using only the CFSI series itself.
8 
This benchmark model further extends CFSI’s capacity for monitoring and forecasting systemic 
risk. In addition, it establishes a minimum performance standard for subsequent EWS 
development.
9 The decomposition of CFSI into its components allows for intriguing 
interpretations of economic conditions and permits detailed observations of the effects of 
regulatory measures to reduce systemic risk through specific financial-stress components. 
Section 6 discusses some significant CSFI results. First, we consider the evidence for a 
structural connection between financial deregulation and the pattern of systemic stress episodes. 
Our evidence suggests that although the frequency of systemic stress episodes remains consistent 
before and after U.S. financial deregulation, the duration pattern of systemic stress episodes 
changes. We observe that after deregulation, the speed of systemic stress propagation is reduced 
(the benefit of risk diversification for individual institutions); however, the length of recovery 
from systemic stress also slows substantially (the penalty of universal banking). We also 
compare CSFI to alternative stress indexes. 
In section 7, we address various applications of CFSI: EWS, monitoring, and identifying 
stress episodes. We begin by discussing additional data and technical considerations to improve 
the use of CSFI as a dependent variable in a systemic-risk EWS. Effective application of a stress 
index for an early warning of systemic stress hinges on the index capacity to differentiate 
idiosyncratic risk. A desirable frequency for EWS would minimize the presence of idiosyncratic 
stress episodes. We proceed, therefore, by investigating the optimal stress-signaling regime and 
CFSI frequency
10 for use in EWS of systemic risk and monitoring systemic financial stress. 
Finally, we ask three surveillance and policy questions: how can a CFSI measure be usefully 
                                                            
8   By contrast, Hatzius et al. (2010) and Brave and Butters (2011) seek to monitor and forecast economic activity 
and to develop financial conditions indexes. These studies confront the critical question of how to distinguish 
financial stress from the various cyclical effects of economic activity. Hatzius selects, from among the 
candidates, the index with optimal performance in forecasting economic growth (e.g., GDP). Unlike these 
concurrent independent studies, we wish to use FSI for forecasts of systemic banking risk rather than forecasts 
of economic activity. Economic conditions enter CFSI exogenously. The selected CFSI utilizes a credit-
weighting method that dynamically reflects changing economic conditions by changing weights. 
9   This is discussed more fully in Oet, Eiben, Gramlich, Miller, and Ong (2011). 
10   Although CFSI is constructed using daily data, monitoring frequency produces different CFSI series, each of 
which aggregates the data within its monitoring horizon. Increasing the frequency of CFSI monitoring increases 
the presence of idiosyncratic events within CFSI. Successful application of CFSI as a dependent variable for an 
early warning system requires the use of an index that can effectively sift out idiosyncratic stresses. We show 
that a quarterly CFSI possesses this useful quality for an EWS application. It is desirable to maximize the 
frequency of monitoring, while minimizing idiosyncratic events. We describe the testing and selection of the 
optimal CFSI frequency from the following monitoring windows: quarterly, FOMC-meeting frequency, 
monthly, bi-weekly, weekly, and daily. 6 
 
interpreted: what does it communicate about the probability of systemic stress; and what policy-
action thresholds should be considered in its use. To this end, we quantify and test a CSFI-based 
rating system. In the process, we test the applicability of the Bordo, Dueker, and Wheelock 
(2000) conjecture on the rating classification of stress thresholds. We conclude by demonstrating 
the use of CFSI benchmarking for dating systemic stress episodes. 
2. Identifying systemic risk conditions 
2.1. Historical precedents for identifying systemic risk
11 
In the early 1980s and 1990s, the concepts of systemic risk and systemic crises tended to be 
synonymous, leading to binary measurement of systemic risk—either crisis or no crisis—and 
identification relied on professional consensus.
12 
As this period reveals, systemic risk conditions manifest differently in the banking system, in 
a broader set of financial companies, or in securities and FX markets.
13 Thus, there is obviously 
some “subjectivity associated with banking crisis identification.”
14 Investigating the definitions 
applied in 13 research studies, Ishihara (2005)
15 finds six different types of financial crises, then 
defines and measures them individually.
16 Because excessively narrow definitions may lead to 
inconsistent policies, and crises are increasingly multidimensional, the author suggests a broader 
concept for conceptualizing and assessing them. 
Literature from the 1990s and 2000s focuses on the search for a reassessment and a new 
definition of systemic risk. Caprio and Klingebiel (1996) and Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache 
(1998) highlight the fact that systemic risk is related to the point at which most of financial 
firms’ capital is exhausted. In their broad survey of systemic risk, De Bandt and Hartmann 
(2000) define a systemic crisis as an “event that affects a considerable number of financial 
                                                            
11   Parts of an earlier version of this section appear in Gramlich, Miller, Oet, and Ong (2010). 
12   See, for example, Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) and Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999). Professional 
consensus is established by precedent and acceptance in the relevant literature. 
13   EWSs in finance started in the 1990s with models for predicting currency and national debt crises; specific 
EWSs for banking system distress have been proposed more recently, for example, by Berg, Borensztein, and 
Pattillo (2004), pp. 4, 7. 
14   Davis and Karim (2008), p. 97. 
15   Ishihara (2005), p. 8. 
16   The types of crises are: banking liquidity, banking solvency, balance of payments, currency, external debt, 
growth rate, and financial crisis. 7 
 
institutions or markets in a strong sense.”
17 Another descriptive dimension is introduced by 
Hendricks, Kambhu, and Mosser (2007),
18 who emphasize disrupted transmission structures as 
characteristics of systemic crises; in these structures, “systemic risk is the movement from one 
stable (positive) equilibrium to another stable (negative) equilibrium.” The extent and speed of 
this movement depend mainly on the system’s complexity and the shift from classical, bank-
based crises to more recent, market-based financial crises. Similarly, Kambhu, Weidman, and 
Krishnan (2007)
19 refer to systemic risk as a “tendency toward a rapid and large transition from 
one stable state to another, possibly less favorable, state.” They point out that the physical and 
financial worlds are both characterized by nonlinear, complex adaptive systems. 
To avoid the “post-crisis bias” resulting from a false assessment of recovery phases, Bussière 
and Fratzscher (2002) introduced a three-state classification of crises based on a multinomial 
logit model. These concepts of systemic risk, however, have several drawbacks. The binary and 
three-regime approaches ignore market stresses that approached (but never met) crisis standards; 
they also exclude situations that were successfully managed but might otherwise have become 
crises.
20 
Consequently, more recent research suggests a richer approach to systemic financial risk as a 
continuous variable, with crisis as an extreme value. Bordo, Dueker, and Wheelock (2000) 
develop the concept of “an index of financial conditions” (henceforth FCI), examining whether 
aggregate price shocks are useful for dating financial instability. Using regime-switching models, 
the authors measure FCI as an index of destabilized financial conditions based on “unanticipated 
movements in the aggregate price level or inflation rate.” 
Further studies extend this scheme. The recent literature includes two alternative approaches 
with different end-user objectives. In the first, systemic indexes, designed to predict economic 
conditions, develop as FSIs along the lines of the original Bordo, Dueker, and Wheelock (2000) 
research. An FCI derives potential financial stress by combining different price vectors on 
financial markets, principally vectors related to interest rates and equity prices.
21 Here, financial 
conditions are most often described in terms of deviation from a long-term trend and are 
                                                            
17   De Bandt and Hartmann (2000), p. 11. 
18   P. 65. 
19   P. 6. 
20   The IMF (2009, Responding), p. 145, emphasizes that binary variables do not measure the intensity of the 
stress.  
21   An overview is given by Swiston (2008), pp. 3–5. 8 
 
measured in standard deviations from the mean.
22 English, Tsatsaronis, and Zoli (2005), 
Rosenberg (2008), and Swiston (2008) link FCIs to subsequent bank lending standards and from 
there to macroeconomic activity and inflation. Financial conditions are thus connected to overall 
fluctuations in the economy, and FCI is used for predicting economic up- and downturns. 
In the second approach, systemic indexes, which pursue the supervisory objective of averting 
risk manifestations in the financial system, develop along the lines of Illing and Liu (2003, 2006) 
as financial stress indexes (FSIs). Illing and Liu examine financial stress “as a continuous 
variable with a spectrum of values, where extreme values are called a crisis,” allowing more 
information to be contained in the stress measure and avoiding some arbitrary boundaries for the 
beginnings and ends of crises.
23 Exploring systemic risk in Canada from a supervisory 
perspective, Illing and Liu (2006) provide an overview of different observable variables used to 
assess crises originating in the banking, foreign exchange, debt, and equity sectors, as well as 
multi-sector, composite crises. They show how stress measures vary between and within the 
crisis categories, sometimes referring to more subjective or objective criteria. The authors 
compare nine differently constructed indicators, concluding that the most appropriate are based 
on standard observable variables and weighted by the respective sector’s “share of total credit in 
the economy.”
24 Their index relies principally on spreads, betas, and interest rates, with the level 
of financial stress determined as a weighted aggregation of various sub-indexes. Hanschel and 
Monnin (2005) use the same type of stress index to investigate systemic risk in Switzerland. 
In short, the historical precedents in systemic risk identification show the evolution of a 
debate among academics, policymakers, and financial practitioners. The literature shows that the 
definition of systemic risk varies according to the underlying objectives. 
2.2. Do precedents provide sufficient identification for supervisory objectives? 
Selection of a working definition of systemic risk is a prerequisite to identifying and 
measuring it. From supervisors’ point of view, systemic risk may be referred to as the risk of 
financial institutions’ correlated default, strongly affecting the system’s risk capital and liquidity, 
                                                            
22   For example, Bloomberg uses a set of three vectors—money market rates, bond market spreads, and equity 
prices—equally weighted and calculated for the 1994–2008 period. See Rosenberg (2008), p. 8. 
23   Illing and Liu show that crises in Canada have been influenced by three broad sets of issues: country-specific, 
and North American issues, as well as issues elsewhere. 
24   Illing and Liu (2006), p. 255. 9 
 
with subsequent negative feedback effects on real markets. Thus, a useful approach in terms of 
supervisory objectives is to identify systemic risk through a continuous index measure of 
financial stress. Operationally, a continuous index definition must allow resolution of the ensuing 
crisis identification problems, specifically the precise timing of episodes and the differentiation 
of their relative severity. 
To establish further the desirable features of systemic risk definition for supervisory 
objectives, it is useful to confirm exactly why the precedents that do not establish a continuous 
measure of systemic risk are insufficient. Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2005) define 
systemic crises as events in which at least one of four conditions is present: large-scale 
nationalization occurs; emergency measures are taken to assist the banking system; the cost of 
the rescue operations equals at least 2 percent of GDP; and non-performing assets equal at least 
10 percent of total assets. Somewhat similarly, Laeven and Valencia (2008) define systemic 
crises as events characterized by the existence of at least one of four occurrences: deposit runs;
25 
introduction of deposit freezes or blanket guarantees; liquidity support; and bank interventions.
26 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) require at least one of two conditions: bank runs,
27 and emergency 
measures taken to assist the banking system.
28 
If we consider the first set of precedents in light of supervisory EWS objectives, we 
encounter some serious problems in defining systemic episodes. The definitions include either 
en-masse bank insolvencies or government interventions, which are inconsistent with the 
supervisory need for a definition that allows time to avert negative outcomes. In addition, these 
definitions cannot describe the continuous states of the banking system or differentiate the 
severity of systemic episodes. 
Boyd, De Nicolò, and Loukoianova (2010) offer an additional critique, pointing out that 
defining systemic risk from a crisis perspective involves mixing economy-driven shocks with 
governmental responses. If the effects of governmental actions were not integrated, systemic 
conditions would develop much earlier, and conventional indicators would recognize them too 
late. To remedy this, Boyd, De Nicolò, and Loukoianova propose measuring systemic bank 
                                                            
25   Defined as a monthly percentage decline in deposits exceeding 5 percent. 
26   Defined as the ratio of monetary authorities’ claims on banks as a fraction of total deposits of at least 5 percent 
and at least double the ratio compared to the previous year. 
27   Defined as the public sector’s closure, merging, or takeover of one or more financial institutions. 
28   Defined as closure, merging, takeover, or large-scale government assistance of an important financial institution 
(or group of institutions), marking the start of a string of similar outcomes for other financial institutions. 10 
 
shocks (SBS) through extremes of observable drops in real lending and deposits. They construct 
two types of SBS indicators dictated by data availability and distribution across all countries, 
indexing extreme drops in real lending and bank deposits (25
th and 10
th percentiles). SBSs are 
then measured by means of a theoretical model in which banking problems are produced by 
exogenous shocks to the industry. The authors emphasize the importance of separating systemic 
conditions from the ensuing governmental response. Significantly, the proposed method for 
identifying systemic banking shocks utilizes observable institutional data. From a supervisory 
EWS perspective, this is a considerable improvement. By focusing on systemic banking shocks, 
the authors address the problems associated with identifying crises. Using observable 
institutional data reduces the problems posed by long lags between the emergence of observable 
bank shocks and en masse bank insolvencies. Empirically, however, the study’s data limitations 
and lack of U.S.-specific dating constrain its effectiveness as a supervisory EWS. 
The continuous index approach, which is similar to that of Bordo, Dueker, and Wheelock 
(2000), is more promising because financial conditions are never absolutely good or absolutely 
bad (that is, they resist binary classification) but are relatively better or worse. Distinguishing the 
relative degree of criticality as a continuous measure is certainly daunting, but very desirable. A 
binary system of distress identification makes it difficult to distinguish how much worse one 
episode is relative to another. A measure of criticality in terms of underlying stress is very 
useful; it enables a relative assessment of stress episodes. Significantly, this approach allows 
financial conditions to be measured in continuity without requiring a priori definition of systemic 
conditions. Instead, once the measure is obtained, a continuity of stress measures can be 
interpreted using a rating system approach and calibrated by comparison with a historical series. 
Bordo, Dueker, and Wheelock transform variable data by standardizing the measured distance 
between each observation and the sub-period median divided by the variable’s standard 
deviation. The overall index is aggregated simply as an unweighted average of these 
standardized distances across component variables. Although the authors do not offer a 
definition of systemic conditions, they do provide a methodology for measuring them 
continuously and suggest a rating-system approach to identification.
29 
                                                            
29   In reference to the sub-period mean, the authors proposed the following five-state empirical calibration of FCI: 
severe distress – Zt > 1.5 std, moderate distress – Zt >0.75 std, normal – -0.75 < Zt > 0.75 std, moderate 
expansion –-1.5 < Zt < –0.75 std, euphoria – Zt < –1.5 std. 11 
 
2.3. Do precedents provide crisis dating sufficient for supervisory objectives? 
In addition to the identification of stress, the second difficulty for supervisory purposes 
involves the use of precedents in the literature for dating stress episodes. This, of course, is a 
corollary of misalignment of objectives in identifying systemic stress conditions. Unlike the 
literature aiming to date crisis episodes, supervisors are interested in a nuanced dated series of 
potential systemic stress. Typically, authors seeking identification through systemic crises 
recognize only two U.S. episodes since 1980: the savings and loan crisis, generally dated to 
1988, and the subprime crisis of 2007; other significant stress episodes
30 are conspicuously 
missing. The second major limitation of existing studies is their reliance on survey-based crisis 
dating. This leads to subjective interpretation of dating and tends to define systemic conditions 
through crisis response. Thus, as Boyd, De Nicolò, and Loukoianova point out, the crisis series 
tend to identify crises too late. 
Again, the continuous index measures fit supervisory objectives better. The Bordo, Dueker, 
and Wheelock (2000) annual FCI index can differentiate three distinct episodes between 1980 
and 2000: severe distress in 1982–86 and two periods of moderate distress: 1981 and 1987–92. 
One important advantage of this approach is the availability of a historically deep index series. 
Unfortunately, the annual FCI is sub-optimal because its frequency does not enable supervisors 
to observe any conditions until all data for the year has been collected. The resulting lag 
seriously undermines the annual FCI’s ability to serve supervisors. Clearly, having more frequent 
data is essential to inform supervisors ex ante. 
2.4. Defining systemic risk through financial stress 
Given the supervisory objectives of monitoring systemic banking risk in the financial sector 
for ex ante actions, a financial stress index approach is more fitting than a financial conditions 
approach. To further clarify the criteria for selecting appropriate stress index components, it is 
critical to consider the first principles of financial stress index design. For Illing and Liu, 
“financial stress is defined as the force exerted on economic agents by uncertainty and changing 
expectations of loss in financial markets and institutions. Financial stress is a continuum.”
31 
                                                            
30   For example, the LTCM crisis and the Asian crisis. 
31   Illing and Liu (2006), p. 243. 12 
 
Therefore, a measure of financial stress—the financial stress index—“is a continuous variable 
with a spectrum of values, where extreme values are called financial crises.” Similarly, Hanschel 
and Monnin state that the financial stress index “represents a continuum of states, describing the 
banking sector’s condition ranging from low levels of stress, where the banking sector is 
tranquil, to high levels of stress, where the banking sector is in a severe crisis.”
32 Illing and Liu 
further maintain that “if financial stress is systemic, economic behaviour can be altered 
sufficiently to have adverse effects on the real economy… Stress increases with expected 
financial loss, with risk (a widening in the distribution of probable loss), or with uncertainty 
(lower confidence about the shape of the distribution of probable loss).”
33 
It is important to remember that components of the financial stress index must be directly 
observable in the markets. They can be explained in terms of loss expectations, risk, and 
uncertainty, among others, but are not equivalent to risk in its standard computational finance 
sense of statistical volatility. In pursuing an understanding of systemic risk from first principles, 
we must include only first observations of it. Economically, financial stresses are observable, 
continuous manifestations of “forces exerted on economic agents.” This is a critical point in 
guiding selection of components of a financial stress index. To proceed, we must now consider 
what types of observable factors describe stress on economic agents. 
There is rich set of theoretical precedents showing the importance of particular spreads in the 
context of micro- and macroeconomic equilibria. Reviewing the seminal studies on this subject, 
Freixas and Rochet (2008) discuss the importance of external finance spread for monetary policy 
transmission, affirmed by both theoretical and empirical studies.
34 The critical role of the 
external finance spread emerges differently in alternative models. In the Bernanke and Gertler 
(1990) theoretical study, the importance of the spread for financial fragility emerges from the 
perspective of investment and agency costs. Bernanke and Gertler (1995) consider various types 
of spread empirically, according to their role in the credit channel of monetary policy 
transmission. In Holmström and Tirole (1997), the spread results from “scarcity of bank capital.” 
In Bolton and Freixas (2000), the cause is “adverse selection in the capital markets.” As Freixas 
and Rochet (2008) point out, the spread’s key role in various channels of monetary policy 
                                                            
32   Hanschel and Monnin (2005), p. 431. 
33   Illing and Liu (2006), p. 244. 
34   Freixas and Rochet (2008), p. 198: “[The] external finance premium, defined as the wedge between the cost of 
funds raised externally and the opportunity cost of internal funds, [is] an essential key in understanding of the 
transmission mechanism.” 13 
 
transmission results from its amplification effect on interest rates and generating the financial 
accelerator effect.
35 
A survey of the current literature on continuous indexes reveals a lack of consistency in 
applying the above theoretical contributions to the selection of index components. Current 
studies of continuous indexes generally allow use of both spreads and the conceptually similar 
volatility indexes as index components. We choose not to mix these two related types of market 
stress information. A benefit of this choice is the availability of volatility series for unbiased 
selection and benchmarking among alternative financial stress indexes. The decision is supported 
partially by the abovementioned theoretical insights into the importance of spreads and partially 
by empirical reasoning. 
While both volatility indexes and spreads provide observations of market stress, one critique 
of their concurrent use in constructing a financial stress index is that they provide qualitatively 
different insights. Volatility indexes blend the prices of many securities. They hide the causal 
transmission mechanism by which the factors entering the volatility series influence the stress 
index, making the mechanism a “black box”
36—that is, only indirectly observable—and 
obfuscating the stress index. By contrast, spreads are differences between two related securities. 
Their definition clarifies the transmission mechanism in spread changes. Empirically, it is also 
interesting to note that a spread-based financial stress index appears to identify stress episodes 
more quickly than alternative indexes that use mixed methods (see Fig. 15 in section 6.2). In 
addition, Table 17 in Appendix C shows that a spread-based financial index frequently leads 
(that is, has stronger one-way Granger causality than) the volatility indexes in the interbank and 
credit markets.
37 
Based on careful consideration of fit to study objectives, it is possible to proceed empirically 
and to modify the components found in earlier financial stress index studies. To do so, we begin 
by considering that the system consists of financial institutions and financial markets, which 
“exhibit three forms of interaction: competition, complementarity, and co-evolution.”
38 What we 
can observe continuously are stresses on financial institutions in the financial markets. In each 
                                                            
35   Ibid. 
36   We use the term “black box” in a sense similar to that of Bernanke and Gertler (1995), “Inside the Black Box: 
The Credit Channel of Monetary Policy Transmission.” 
37   In the interbank market, we used the MOVE volatility index. In the credit market, we used the LBOX and 
BBOX volatility indexes. 
38   Song and Thakor (2010), p. 1024. 14 
 
distinct financial market, we can distinguish the typical products involved in financial 
institutions’ interaction and observe the corresponding applied stresses. These applied stresses 
would generally be spreads—differences between applied economic forces; for example, 
arbitrage spreads between risky and “risk-less” products and liquidity (bid–ask) spreads 
capturing differences between supply and demand. 
Following the analysis of Illing and Liu, we can distinguish at least four financial markets: 
interbank, credit, equity, and foreign exchange. Financial institutions access interbank market to 
seek direct financing (through bank bonds) and indirect financing (through interbank borrowing), 
and to manage liquidity and interest rate risk. Reasonable measures of stress in the interbank 
market therefore would consist of spreads capturing pressures on bank bonds, interbank 
borrowing, and interbank liquidity. In addition, it may be useful to consider overall stress on the 
interbank market relative to the overall stock market. In the credit market, financial institutions 
act as intermediaries for short- and long-term borrowing. Thus, measures of stress in the credit 
market would include spreads capturing pressures on corporate bonds, commercial papers, and 
the Treasury yield curve, as well as liquidity (bid–ask) pressures on Treasuries. In addition, the 
relative stress on U.S. vs. international credit markets may be observed through covered interest-
rate parity spreads. In the equity market, it is reasonable to include observable measures that 
describe the extent to which financial equities in the S&P 500 have dropped over the previous 
year. Similarly, in the foreign exchange market, we can include observable measures of flight 
from the U.S. dollar toward a set of foreign currencies. 
2.5. Supervisory applications: Identifying systemic stress and distress severity 
There are two main supervisory applications for a measure of financial stress: first, 
identifying and dating episodes of systemic stress, and second, determining whether the financial 
stress level is critical: in other words, whether observed financial stress constitutes a financial 
crisis. 
2.5.1. Identification of systemic stress 
As discussed in Gramlich, Miller, Oet, and Ong (2010), the first of these applications, 
identification of systemic stress, is based on a continuous notion of what conditions constitute 
financial stress, namely the transmission of distress, the extent of distress, and the type of 15 
 
distress, that is, the financial markets involved. Operationally, systemic stress should be 
identified by these three conditions. More specifically, transmission of distress involves selecting 
observable market characteristics (for example, spreads and betas) and setting a threshold above 
which these characteristics are considered to be in distress. Extent of distress involves selecting 
the period of time over which the persistence of distress is observed. Finally, type of distress 
involves choosing markets that in combination may be deemed to raise systemic concerns. The 
choices made operationally may vary to yield more or less sensitive interpretations of systemic 
stress, resulting in a flexible identification scheme. Here again, identification must fit the overall 
objectives. 
For purposes of supervisory ex ante monitoring, we wish the identification to be reasonably 
sensitive. From a supervisor’s perspective, the sensitivity of the ex ante identification of systemic 
stress is important because the supervisory remedy would be based on balancing regulatory 
actions’ costs against their benefits. If the supervisor sets the definition of systemic stress too 
low, the monitoring of systemic stress will be inefficient. Once a condition is assessed as 
systemic, supervisory resources will be engaged in the cost–benefit analysis. There is also a risk 
that some conditions that are inherently not truly systemic will be identified as systemic. In this 
case as well, the supervisory action may be inefficient—that is, the cost of action would be 
wasted—because markets would otherwise be able to resolve and stabilize the conditions. 
Worse, the supervisory action itself could be destabilizing if it caused adverse effects and 
generated undesirable feedback effects, which might be avoided if normal market mechanisms 
self-correct. By contrast, if supervisors were to identify systemic stress conservatively, then they 
would fail to understand and act in timely fashion to arrest its evolution. 
An example of excessive sensitivity would be the identification of systemic stress on the 
basis of daily stress fluctuations. Beyond this, it becomes difficult to gauge the right level of 
sensitivity a priori. The best approach may well be iterative: 
1.  Select specific choices for transmission of distress, extent of distress, and type of distress. 
2.  Evaluate the sensitivity of the resulting systemic stress episode identification. If there are 
too many false positives, decrease the sensitivity of the identification scheme and re-
evaluate. 
Exclusion of idiosyncratic events serves as a useful additional constraint on the identification 
of systemic stress. Setting the extent of distress to a daily or weekly interval would result in a 16 
 
very volatile stress index with too many idiosyncratic stress episodes: market rumors, 
unsubstantiated fears, political events, etc. As we show in this paper, quarterly extent of distress 
excludes random and idiosyncratic events and is useful for a supervisory EWS. However, it is 
possible that this extent of distress is too conservative for the purposes of supervisory 
monitoring. This line of rationalization helps to constrain the extent of distress somewhere 
between one week and one quarter. 
This reasoning leads us to the initial selection of operational choices for transmission of 
distress, extent of distress, and type of distress for the purposes of supervisory monitoring using 
CFSI. For transmission of distress, we begin by selecting a distress threshold of one standard 
deviation above previous quarterly levels. For extent of distress, we select two consecutive 
weeks of distress. For type of distress, we focus on distress conditions that affect at least two 
distinct markets. The choices result in the following operational definition or identification of 
systemic stress episodes with CFSI: Systemic stress is characterized by two consecutive weeks of 
distress above previous quarterly thresholds, or concurrent weekly distress in at least two 
distinct markets. The intent of this approach is to set a lower threshold for monitoring systemic 
stress in order to increase ability to identify, ex ante, episodes that have the potential to become 
critical.
39 
Applying this scheme results in the identification of 50 systemic stress episodes from the 
fourth quarter of 1991 to the fourth quarter of 2010. Twenty-five of them were previously 
identified in the literature; the remaining 25 are market shocks that are known, but typically are 
not identified in the literature as U.S. financial stress episodes or crises. These episodes include a 
mix of both systematic and idiosyncratic events,
40 suggesting that the above initial operational 
definition may be improved further. We discuss the process and results of identification of stress 
episodes in more detail in section 5.3. 
2.5.2. Identifying distress severity 
The current literature on continuous index measures, of both financial conditions and 
financial stress, generally report the indexes as Zt standardized distances, without providing 
explicit thresholds for identifying distress severity. Bordo, Dueker, and Wheelock (2000) show 
                                                            
39  Oet and Eiben (2009). 
40   For example, the Gulf War; $17 billion BCCI collapse; global bond markets reversal of 1994, Japanese bank 
runs of 1995, etc. 17 
 
that a continuous index can be used to identify distress severity independent of the dating of 
systemic conditions, using Zt standardized distances from the median. They suggest a five-
category differentiation of distress: “severe distress,” “moderate distress,” “normal,” “moderate 
expansion,” and “euphoria.”
41 Certainly, the use of a common scale facilitates comparison 
among alternative indexes. Establishing thresholds to identify distress severity is an even more 
useful application of the standardized-distance method of index measurement. In section 5.6 of 
this paper, we extend Bordo, Dueker, and Wheelock’s idea for measuring distress severity using 
a probit model of CFSI to calibrate the optimal system for rating the severity of distress. 
3. Index construction 
Constructing an indicator of coincident stress is, to put it succinctly, a formidable task. A 
well-constructed financial stress index should be meaningful, not only as a monitoring tool but 
also within a larger EWS. By contrast, a noisy FSI will prove utterly useless to a supervisor 
concerned with monitoring systemic risk. 
When trying to classify a financial crisis, one necessarily contemplates the extent to which a 
host of market variables deviate from some long-term trend. The notion that an abnormal event 
in market A could cause substantial deviations in values within market B (the contagion effect) 
necessarily complicates matters by introducing a feedback effect. This makes the identification 
of leading stress indicators difficult in that the researcher’s choice of indicators may move in 
response to propagation events rather than as the first rumblings of distress. Moreover, in the 
normal course of business-cycle fluctuations, the regulator expects some movement in market 
indicators as part of rational resource allocation. The researcher must be wary of selecting 
indicators that move regularly with the business cycle. 
Having selected appropriate indicators, the researcher hopes to aggregate them into a single 
financial stress index (FSI). A useful framework for accomplishing this task considers two 
factors for each indicator: what is the precedent set by the indicator’s value and how much does 
that precedent matter. One may generate an FSI using the equation 
                                                            
41   Bordo, Dueker, and Wheelock (2000, p. 27) “assign Zt larger than 1.5 standard deviations above the sub-period 
mean to the “severe distress” category; Zt larger than 0.75 standard deviation above the sub-period mean to the 
“moderate distress” category; Zt falling between +/− 0.75 standard deviation of the mean to the “normal” 
category; Zt between –0.75 and –1.5 standard deviations of the mean to the “moderate expansion” category; and 
Zt below –1.5 standard deviations of the mean to the “euphoria” category. 18 
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 ∞     100    (1) 
where the     term is the value of indicator j at time t, the integration term is the CDF of indicator 
j, and the     term is the weight given to indicator j in the FSI at time t. Inspired by the 
continuous financial-stress- index methodology of Illing and Liu (2003, 2006), our FSI is 
currently constructed using daily data from 11 components that reflect four distinct financial 
markets: the interbank, foreign exchange, credit, and equity markets. One of the key technical 
challenges to be overcome by choosing the appropriate weighting methodology is the potential 
for false alarms; this potential should be balanced against the possibility of missing important 
events by setting warning standards too high.
42 
3.1. Description of the data 
Our FSI uses daily observable financial-market data to capture the continuity of stress in 
financial markets. The data is of high quality; its sources are the Federal Reserve FRED 
database, Bloomberg, and the Bank of England (see Table 13 in Appendix A). Note that data 
beginning with the first quarter of 1985 was desired and collected in most cases; however, some 
series were unavailable before certain dates, and no obvious way to improve the data presented 
itself. The most severe constraint is Bloomberg’s 10-year A-rated Bank Bond Index, which is not 
available before September 26, 1991. Two other binding constraints are the S&P 500 Financials 
Total Return Index, which is not available before September 13, 1990; and the S&P Financials 
Price Index, which is not available before September 11, 1989. In principle, it would be possible 
to reconstruct the missing Bloomberg historical data using alternative data sources and 
information on index composition and construction. However, at the time of the project’s initial 
development, this was deemed a suboptimal choice. Consequently, the original development data 
set spans the fourth quarter of 1991 through the first quarter of 2009. Data quality considerations 
partly offset the depth limitation of the constrained choices described above. Most constituent 
time series contain some data gaps prior to 1987, but fewer gaps to 1994. Thus, starting the 
dataset in 1991 avoided the excessive costs of reconstructing time series and minimized data-gap 
problems. 
                                                            
42   Gramlich, Miller, Oet, and Ong (2009), p. 17. 19 
 
3.2. Variable selection –  jt x  
To be certain that a versatile index of stress has been identified, the researcher aims to 
represent a spectrum of markets in which stress may originate. As previous research in this field 
attests, representatives of conditions in credit, foreign exchange, equity, and interbank markets 
provide substantial coverage of potential stress origination. The indicators for—and construction 
of—each of the four sectors discussed earlier are outlined below. 
I—Interbank markets 
(1) Financial beta – This indicator examines the volatility of share prices in the banking 
sector relative to overall stock market volatility. It is appealing to include banking-sector beta 
because it describes the strain on bank profitability, and potentially solvency, in light of changes 
in the profitability of publicly traded companies throughout the economy. The calculation of 
financial beta is  
           	              |   
  ,   |   
   
      |   
       (2) 
where   represents banking sector share prices (S&P 500 Financials Total Return Index);   is 
overall stock market share prices (S&P 500 Total Return Index); and   |   
   and   |   
   are each 
a set of observations from time t to one year earlier. 
(2) Bank bond spread – This spread measures the perceptions of medium- to long-term risk 
in banks issuing A-rated bonds.
43 It is logical to include this measurement because it indicates 
the medium- to long-range risk to high-quality bank profits during periods of rational 
expectations. The calculation is 
      	    	          10     10    (3) 
where 10A refers to 10-year A-rated bank bond yields, and 10TB refers to 10-year Treasury 
yields. 
(3) Interbank liquidity spread
44 – Examination of the TED spread provides some evidence 
regarding the perception of counterparty risk in interbank lending. The TED spread—the 
                                                            
43  A rating constitutes a composite computed by Bloomberg for its C07010Y Index (10-year A-rated Bank Bond 
Index) and comprising equally weighted S&P, Moody’s, Fitch, and DBRS components. 
44   The interbank liquidity spread as a component of the banking sector is provided by Illing and Liu in extension 
of the precedent FSI model. 20 
 
difference between the three-month LIBOR rate and three-month Treasury yields—serves as a 
general indicator of overall liquidity risk because it reflects the risk premium associated with 
lending to commercial banks. When market liquidity is scarce, Treasuries trade at a premium and 
the spread between the two rates increases. The spread also increases when the risk of default on 
interbank loans rises. As an indicator of reduction in market liquidity, a rising TED spread can 
also serve as an indicator of downturns in equity markets. 
By comparing LIBOR rates with three-month Treasury yields, one can observe periods of 
rising expectations of default risk on borrowed funds as the TED spread grows, worsening 
financial stress. The calculation is  
           	         	         3     	       3  	    (4) 
where 3mo	L represents three-month LIBOR rates and 3mo	TB represents 90-day Treasury bill 
secondary-market rates. 
(4) Interbank cost of borrowing
45 – This indicator measures the degree of apprehension with 
which banks loan to one another. By taking the 90-day LIBOR–Fed funds spread as a metric, the 
researcher identifies the risk premium that banks pay to borrow short-term funds from one 
another. The greater the spread, the more stressful are the conditions in interbank lending 
markets. The LIBOR–Fed funds spread is conceptually similar to the LIBOR–OIS spread—the 
latter being the difference between the London Interbank Offered Rate and the Overnight Swap 
Index rate—and can also be used to measure counterparty risk. In an efficiently functioning 
market, the difference between the unsecured LIBOR rate and the Fed funds target rate would 
approach zero through arbitrage. The spread between the two rates indicates either increases in 
default risk on the part of counterparties in a transaction or a lack of capital requirements for 
banks to engage in arbitrage. The indicator is calculated as follows: 
           	    	  	            3     	            (5) 
where 3mo	L is the three-month LIBOR rate, and FFR is the Federal funds target rate. 
II—Foreign exchange markets 
(5) Weighted dollar crashes – This indicator quantifies flight from the U.S. dollar toward a 
broad set of foreign currencies. With a floating exchange rate, depreciation of domestic currency 
                                                            
45   The interbank cost of borrowing as a component of the banking sector is provided in extension of the precedent 
FSI model by Illing and Liu. 21 
 
represents a loss to its holders, while unexpected volatility heightens uncertainty in foreign 
exchange markets. The researcher finds this a valuable signal of sharply decreasing foreign 
exchange transactions, which creates a sense of uncertainty as to the profitability of institutions 
system-wide. A reasonable implication of such uncertainty is increased demand for liquidity 
from the domestic financial system, requiring unanticipated, and potentially inefficient, lending. 
The calculation of this variable uses the formula 
          	      	        	
  
     ∈     |   , ,…,     (6) 
where x is the Trade-Weighted $U.S. Exchange Index. 
III—Credit markets 
(6) Covered interest spread – This spread provides insight into uncertainty regarding 
government bond markets. Using U.K. government bonds as the counterpart to U.S. bills, 
arbitrage opportunities in efficiently functioning government-debt markets should drive the 
covered interest spread to zero. If the spread remains persistently non-zero, then the data signals 
arbitrageurs’ unwillingness to hold a particular government’s debt. This can imply a nation’s 
difficulty in acquiring liquidity for governments, signaling the onset of stress. The calculation is 
         	        	           1    
∗    
  
  
∗  1      (7) 
where r* is the 90-day U.K. Treasury bill rate as of noon on day t; F is the 90-day forward rate 
for the U.K.–U.S. exchange rate as of noon on day t; S* is the spot U.K.–U.S. exchange rate as 
of noon on day t; and r is the 90-day U.S. Treasury bill rate as of noon on day t. 
(7) Corporate bond spread – This, like the bank bond spread, measures medium- to long-
term risk; it includes impressions of risk from corporations in all sectors. The researcher finds 
that the corporate bond spread is a useful stress indicator because, when the probability of losses 
increases, firms have trouble financing debt and may be less able to obtain liquidity, which 
implies still greater stress. The calculation is  
           	    	          10      10    (8) 
where 10CB is the 10-year Moody’s Aaa-rated corporate bond yield; and 10TB is the 10-year 
Treasury yield. 
(8) Liquidity spread – This spread measures changes in the short-term trend of differences in 
bid prices (BP) and ask prices (AP) on three-month Treasury bills. The bid–ask spread is a 22 
 
component
46 of security transaction cost for concurrent sale (AP) and purchase (BP). As the 
spread (transaction cost) decreases, market security becomes more liquid. As instrument liquidity 
shrinks, the difference between its concurrent purchase price and sale price (the bid–ask spread) 
increases. Thus, market security’s bid–ask spread measures its liquidity. The greater the spread, 
the more illiquid the market security and the greater the stress. The calculation is  
     	   	          
 
   ∑  
           
 
           
   
    
     (9) 
where the moving average is calculated over the previous 30 trading days. 
(9) 90-Day commercial paper–Treasury bill spread – This spread measures the short-term 
risk premium on financial companies’ debt. During periods of rational expectations, this 
differential informs the researcher of changes in the underlying risk of financial companies’ 
operations. The indicator is found by taking the difference between 90-day financial commercial 
paper rates (90day	CP) and 90-day Treasury bill secondary market rates (3mo	TB). The 
calculation is 
  90   	    .     	     .           90   	        3  	     (10) 
Because data on 90-day financial and non-financial commercial paper rates only go back to 1Q: 
1997, weekly 90-day commercial paper rates were used as a proxy for financial paper from 4Q: 
1996 back to 1Q: 1985. 
(10) Treasury–yield curve spread – The literature on the slope of the yield curve shows that 
the variable is a useful predictor of recessions.
47 Because of the combination of long-term 
uncertainty and short-term liquidity needs at the outset of—and during—recessionary times, 
including this variable as an indicator of financial stress is intuitive. This variable measures the 
30-day moving average of the difference between three-month Treasury bill yields (3mo) on a 
bond-equivalent basis with 10-year constant maturity yields (10yr). The calculation is  
          	     	         
 
   	∑  10       3            
     (11) 
                                                            
46   In addition to dealer fees. 
47  See Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991), Estrella and Mishkin (1996), Estrella and Trubin (2006), Haubrich (2006), 
and Haubrich and Bianco (2011). 23 
 
IV—Equity markets 
(11) Stock market crashes – This indicator captures the extent to which equity values in the 
S&P 500 have dropped since a year earlier. Moreover, by examining movements in the S&P 500 
Financial Index, the researcher gains insight into expectations about the future of the banking 
industry. We calculate the variable in each time period (t) as  
       	      	        	
  
     ∈     |   , ,…,     (12) 
where x refers to the S&P 500 Financials Index. To determine the demand for loanable funds, an 
examination of stock market crashes using the S&P 500 index is pursued, but the results are 
qualitatively similar. 
3.3. Variable transformation –   jt
x





Once the 11 indicators above are computed, the individual time series must be transformed to 
prepare for aggregation into the Financial Stress Index. The process involves generating a 
cumulative density function (CDF) for each indicator. This can be problematic insofar as each 
series spans different dates. To ensure commensurate percentiles, CDFs are generated using a 
common set of dates where data is fully populated for all indicators included in computing the 
FSI.
48 
The process of converting a given indicator into its CDF requires an intermediate step of 
computing a rank ordering of the data in the series. Once the corresponding rank series is 
generated for each indicator, the CDFs are computed as 
           
    	     
      	  	     	             (13) 
In most cases, the higher an indicator’s computed value, the higher the rank associated with 
the value. For instance, a rank of 4,237 would be associated with the largest daily observation in 
the indicator’s time series, while a rank of 1 would belong to the smallest daily observation. 
However, there are several series in which this convention is reversed: weighted dollar crashes, 
                                                            
48   For example, in the initial construction, common dates spanned the period between September 26, 1991 and 
March 31, 2009, resulting in 4,237 daily observations. 24 
 
stock market crashes, and the Treasury–yield curve spread. For these series, the largest daily 
observation of the indicator is assigned a rank of 1, while the smallest observation is ranked 
4,237. 
The reason for the reverse rank ordering of weighted dollar crashes and stock market crashes 
comes from their computation as outlined in section 3.2. Since the observed values of both 
variables are computed as the current value over the past year’s high value, a larger output 
implies a smaller deviation of current value from recent past data and, therefore, a lower 
precedent. The reverse rank ordering of the Treasury–yield curve spread comes from literature 
that demonstrates the relationship between macroeconomic outcomes and the slope of the yield 
curve. Flat or inverted yield curves signal slow growth. Thus, the smaller the calculated yield 
curve spread, the more difficult financing becomes, which indicates a higher precedent. A 
summary of the rank assignments and variable names is provided in Table 14 in Appendix A. 
3.4. Variable weighting –  jt w  
Having appropriately computed the indicators’ CDFs, all that remains is aggregation into the 
FSI. For weights, data from the Federal Reserve Board’s Flow of Funds statistical release (Z.1) 
are used.
49 This data is separated into four sectors: bank loans (BNK), foreign exchange credit 
(FX), equity (EQ), and debt (DT). For any given quarter, total dollar flows through each sector 
are converted into a proportion of total dollar flows through all sectors, using the following 
equation:
50 
   	             	
  
               		, 	∈   ,  ,  ,    (14) 
The Flow of Funds proportions are then used as weights for aggregating the 11 CDF functions 
generated above. Each indicator is identified as belonging to one of the four credit sectors and is 
weighted appropriately. When multiple indicators belong to a single credit sector, the sector 
                                                            
49  The FSI construction involved four competing aggregation methods: equal weights; equal variance weights; 
credit weights; and principal component weights. 
50  In the data gathered, FX flows were missing until 3Q: 1997. To impute the data, the relative proportion of FX 
dollar flow to total flow of funds in each quarter prior to 3Q: 1997 was assumed to be constant, held to its 
known weight in 3Q: 1997 flow of funds data. 25 
 
proportion is divided by the number of indicators in the sector, producing fractional weights. An 
equation representing the procedure follows: 
            	 	             
 	           
      	  	          	  	  (15) 
With the fractional proportions calculated, a daily FSI time series is computed by the 
equation 
               1              2            10          11     
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   	      9        	            (16) 
Once the daily FSI series is generated, a quarterly FSI series is computed by taking a simple 
average of all daily FSI observations in the quarter. 
3.4.1. Alternative variable weighting schemes 
Having deduced the value of an indicator’s precedent, the researcher must determine its 
contribution to overall financial stress during a given period of time. There is a rich literature on 
aggregation weights; this study has compared four alternative weighting schemes: 
(i) Equal weights – In the absence of a priori knowledge of each component’s importance in 
the aggregate index, a common weighting scheme gives all indicators equal importance. Two 
problems are apparent immediately. First, the equal-weighting scheme has no economic 
significance. It lacks intuition and is ultimately arbitrary. Second, the researcher implicitly 
assigns more importance to the economic sector with the highest number of observed variables. 
(ii) Equal variance weights – Another method in this preliminary analysis fixes the variance 
of the weights over time by subtracting the indicator’s sample mean from each observation and 
dividing by the indicator’s sample standard deviation. As above the economic intuition of such a 
weighting technique is not readily clear. 
(iii) Credit weights – To provide economic significance for the aggregation of FSI 
components, a credit weighting scheme is implemented. The four economic sectors under 
scrutiny in this project are weighted according to quarterly data on their share of total credit, 
including debt, equity, foreign exchange, and banking markets from the Federal Reserve Board’s 26 
 
statistical release Z.1 (Flow of Funds).
51 This lends some economic significance to the question 
of how much an indicator’s precedent matters. However, the problem with this method is that 
where there are multiple indicators for a single sector, the sector’s weight is divided evenly 
among them. This method seems to suffer from the same arbitrariness as that which plagues the 
equal weights approach, though less severely, given the weights’ sensitivity to change in total 
credit composition. 
(iv) Principal component – A useful approach for uncovering structural relationships 
between numerous time series is to identify orthogonal eigenvectors of the variance–covariance 
matrix of one’s data. Each of these eigenvectors represents a linear combination of the data series 
employed by the researchers (called a factor) and is capable of tracking a certain percentage of 
the overall variability in the original data. In the forecast literature, it is not uncommon for a 
single factor to be responsible for the great majority of overall variability. Consequently, this 
eigenvector is selected as the appropriate weighting scheme. However, an examination of the 
variance–covariance matrix of the 11 series comprising the FSI in this study reveals that there is 
more than a single eigenvector. Instead, there are four eigenvectors, which together count for 
about 75–80 percent of variability in the data. Knowing this, the researchers create a weighting 
vector by taking the weighted sum of these four eigenvectors (using the proportion of variance 
explained earlier). 
Two drawbacks to the principal-component method are readily apparent. First, many 
economists believe that the justification of these weights is not guided by a priori reasoning; 
therefore, the quality of the findings is increasingly subject to the peculiarities of the data. 
Further, without an a priori framework from which to consider the results, findings may simply 
be accepted as truth rather than challenged on logical grounds. Second, weighting based on a 
single component creates a fixed set of weights for all dates in the analysis, forcing market 
relationships to hold in the data when reality shows they may not. 
   
                                                            
51   Federal Reserve Board statistical release E.16 (Country Exposure Lending Survey) is used to supplement the 
foreign exchange information in the Flow of Funds statistical releases Z.1 and Z.7. 27 
 
4. Results and selection of CFSI weighting method 
4.1. Comparison of candidate weighting methods 
An agnostic selection process begins with the comparison of candidate stress series with 
documented stress episodes. 
 
Fig. 1. Financial Stress Index: standardized monthly candidate series. 
Note: Crisis bars are based on the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland’s expert survey; larger bars reflect scaled 
judgment of greater significance. 
Fig. 1 compares candidate standardized monthly financial stress series from 3Q: 1991 to 1Q: 
2009. For reference, expert ranking assessment of literature-based series of financial crises 
during the same time frame is also shown. The figure suggests a number of comparative 
observations: All weighting methods show episodes of stress that are not documented in the 
literature. The concern here is that this particular set of stress measures is wrongly identifying 
periods of low stress as high stress, an error one may call a false positive. It is also possible, of 
course, that these same episodes simply represent periods in which stress was not large or severe 
enough to attract the attention of researchers or policymakers. The ambiguity is unsettling for 
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monitors? The ambiguity of the expert-based ranking of financial crises does not seem very 
helpful in distinguishing the relative accuracy of the variously weighted stress series. 
Furthermore, different weighting methods produce different interpretations of the same time 
periods. For example, the principal component weights and the credit weight series both indicate 
stress in 2Q–3Q: 1993, whereas both the equal weights and the equal variance weights series 
indicate that this period was expansionary (negative stress). The reverse is true for 1Q: 2003–4Q: 
2004 , which is identified as a period of stress by both the equal weights and the equal variance 
series, while the principal component weights series indicates that this period is in expansion 
(negative stress). Interestingly, the credit weights series provides a more nuanced reading of this 
period. It identifies 1Q: 2003 as stressful; 2Q: 2003–1Q: 2004 as expansionary; and 2Q–4Q: 
2004 as stressful. 
To a policymaker concerned with ex ante action for systemic risk, it is critical to identify 
stressful episodes correctly. The prospect of conflicting identifications of stressful periods is 
particularly alarming. It raises the key question: What would be a sound basis for comparing and 
selecting the optimal financial stress series? In other words, how can the alternative series be 
reliably evaluated for accuracy? 
4.2. Comparison of candidate weighting methods with expert survey 
The literature on continuous index measures, including most recent studies, largely ignores 
the formidable problem of benchmarking. One recent exception is Hatzius et al. (2010), who 
select from the candidate indexes the one that performs best in forecasting economic growth 
through GDP. This approach is not applicable to the present study, whose objective is to forecast 
systemic banking risk rather than economic activity. Illing and Liu (2003) use an expert survey 
to select some alternative weighting schemes, based on a series’ ability to capture the expert rank 
ordering of crisis episodes. For parity, we consider a similar comparison, but control the results 
for demonstrated expertise, tested separately. The light-blue background bars in Fig. 1 represent 
expert-ranked, literature-based financial crises. Comparison of different weighting methods 
reveals that each ranks high-stress episodes differently (see Table 1). This is not unexpected, 
given that different weighting methods vary in their emphasis on different financial markets and 
conflict in their prioritization of the aggregate stress indexes. 29 
 
Applying a similar method for Canada, Illing and Liu (2003) showed that the credit weights 
series is optimal in minimizing type I/type II errors in rank ordering. By contrast, we consider 
alternative quantitative measures of both rank ordering and timing precedence, seeking the series 
that correlates most closely with the expert rank order, minimizes root mean square error, and 
usefully precedes the onset of financial crises (as shown by one-way Granger precedence). 
Consistent with the findings of Illing and Liu, Table 2 shows that the credit weights series is 
optimal when all three of these considerations are taken into account. 
Table 1 
Chronological rank ordering of survey stress episodes. 










12/2/1991  Scandinavian  Crisis  18 16 13 10 10 
12/16/1991  RE Credit Crunch  8  15  15  12  12 
9/1/1992  ERM  Crisis  14 18 18 16 16 
9/16/1992 U.K.  Black  Wed  14  14  12  8  8 
10/3/1994  Bond Market Crisis  11  8  6  7  13 
12/15/1994 Mexican  Crisis  11  7  7  6  14 
10/27/1997 Asian  Crisis  8  6  9  11  5 
9/1/1998  LTCM  Crisis  10  1 1 1 1 
3/1/1999  Brazil  Crisis  13 13 11 18 11 
3/1/2000  Dot-com  Crisis  6  10 14 17 19 
2/20/2001  Turkish  Crisis  18  9 8 9 9 
3/15/2001  Early 2000s Recession  4  5  4  4  6 
9/17/2001  Terrorist  Attacks  1  12 16 13 15 
3/1/2002  Stock Market Downturn  7  17  19  14  17 
9/1/2006  Amaranth  Collapse  16 19 17 19 18 
2/27/2007  Chinese  Correction  17 11 10 15  7 
10/11/2007  Subprime  Crisis 3 4 5 5 4 
12/3/2007  Late 2000s Recession  1  2  2  2  2 
6/2/2008  U.S. Bear Market  5  3  3  3  3 
 
Table 2 
Survey rank ordering and timing precedence results. 











Rank Order  Correlation  1.00   0.52   0.28   0.39  0.22  
RMSE  -  5.38   6.54   6.04   6.83  
Timing Precedence  Granger  0.12 / 0.44  0.26/0.72  0.81/0.52  0.35/0.68 
 
4.2.1. Critique of the approach 
Three observations can be made immediately: 
1.  The expert-based rank ordering of the episodes, subjective and qualitative in nature, 
differs substantially from all of the other candidate stress series in ranking several 
crisis episodes, such as “terrorist attacks,” “stock market downturn,” and “early 2000s 
recession,” among others. 30 
 
2.  The candidate stress series contain a number of episodes that are not identified in the 
literature as crisis episodes, for example, stress episodes from the 1993–94 period and 
1996, among others. 
3.  The timing of stress episodes tends to lead the timing of financial crises. This 
relationship makes economic sense, insofar as financial series foretell the advent of 
financial conditions, whereas financial crisis simply registers conditions’ eventual 
deterioration to a recognized critical state. 
These observations raise serious conceptual concerns about the applicability of an expert-
based ranking of crises in validating either the rank ordering or the timing identification of stress 
episodes. This conclusion, of course, is very consistent with our arguments in sections 2.2 and 
2.3. These reasons are discussed below corresponding to the above observations. First, expert 
surveys are based on human emotions that trigger the adrenal “fight-or-flight” response to stress. 
Experts, like the rest of us, still experience greater stress in the events that are the most 
frightening, not necessarily those that are the most systemically stressful. This is apparent in the 
conflicting evaluations of the “terrorist attacks” stress episode by the objective, stress-based 
series and the subjective, expert-score-based Z series (see Fig. 2). Similarly, the systemic impact 
of an event that appears less threatening can be seriously underestimated by experts, as in the 
LTCM stress episode. 
Moreover, the expert survey is subjective and inherently biased toward crisis, mixing shock 
and response. As Boyd, De Nicolò, and Loukoianova (2010) show, one corollary of this is that 
the crisis series and the shock series have different rank orders.
52 Lastly, as discussed earlier, the 
expert-based timing of stress episodes is inherently flawed; it is generally the product of 
professional consensus, with accidental, rather than predefined, timing identification. Thus, we 
find the survey-based selection method problematic and must find a more rigorous method. 
                                                            
52   Boyd, De Nicolò, and Loukoianova (2010), p. 14. 31 
 
 
Fig. 2. Comparison of objective and subjective standardized monthly series. 
4.3. Selection of CFSI from candidate weighting methods 
Following a rigorous financial-stress-series selection process, we show that using the credit 
weights construction method for CFSI is optimal, both for use in a supervisory EWS and for 
monitoring systemic banking risk. This finding further confirms earlier survey-based results 
(section 4.2), as well as similar results by Illing and Liu (2003, 2006). Additional tests to 
optimize the monitoring frequency of the selected CFSI are described in section 5.5. The 
following selection method is used to determine which measure of financial stress best represents 
systemic stress. 
1. Select volatility series to benchmark financial stress 
The ability to create an early warning system (EWS) hinges on accurate identification of 
stressful and non-stressful periods. Stress is directly observable as a continuum difference 
between factors affecting entire market populations. Several types of stress are observable in 
each market, typically through measures that describe the relative risk/return differential of a 







































































































































































































































market liquidity. An alternative aggregate risk measure may be obtained using market volatility 
indexes, which estimate overall market risk statistically and are generally obtained directly from 
a sub-population of market participants. 
An estimation error is inherent in volatility indexes, insofar as the market population differs 
from that entering the index. Given the supervisory objectives of ex ante action for systemic risk, 
the advantage of observing the factors underlying market distress is clear.
53 Nevertheless, 
volatility measures prove very useful in benchmarking candidate stress series. Comparing the 
candidate stress series to volatility benchmarks is valuable for determining which weighting 
scheme best tracks stress. To this end, we select benchmark market volatility series for each 
financial market.
54 Since the current version of CFSI addresses four distinct markets—interbank, 
FX, credit, and equity—we chose volatility indexes that describe these markets—MOVE, 
VDAX, LBOX,
55 and VIX, respectively. 
2. Define systemic stress 
Define systemic stress as two consecutive weeks of market volatility above the previous 
quarterly thresholds, or concurrent volatility in at least two distinct markets. 
3. Extract a reference series of stress signals in each market 
First, each benchmark is transformed into a weekly indicator of stress in the representative 
market (see Fig. 3). The calculation is as follows: 
    , ,    	     	      	      	          , ,           , ,             ,             ,     (17) 
                                                            
53   We discussed the opacity of volatility indexes vis-à-vis spreads in section 2.4. It may be useful to elaborate the 
argument here as well. Market volatility indexes are constructed as weighted blends of prices of specific 
populations. From the standpoint of providing insight about why prices move, a volatility index is essentially a 
“black-box” series that allows only indirect insight into factors causing the movement of market prices. By 
contrast, a spread is a difference in prices between related securities and is observable directly. A change in 
spread communicates the relative activity of the two securities. In addition, the sources of a given change in 
spread are directly observable in the rise and fall of the two securities. 
54  To avoid bias in the financial stress series, CFSI is careful to exclude these volatility series from the financial 
stress construction. In principle, it is also possible to construct a measure that directly utilizes markets’ volatility 
benchmarks (e.g., use of VIX in the FRB St. Louis Financial Stress Index). CFSI avoids direct use of the 
volatility indexes in constructing financial stress for two reasons, one being precedent, and the other a 
preference for constructing the financial stress index from observable market elements (e.g., spreads) that are 
not indexes in themselves. This omission of the individual market volatility indexes makes them useful as a 
benchmark for independent monitoring and benchmarking of the CSFI. 
55  LBOX (Lehman Swaptions Volatility Index) was used in the original benchmarking through September 4, 
2009. LBOX was superseded by In July 2009 by BOX (Barclays Swaptions Volatility Index). 33 
 
where, for each market i, w is the week number in the series and q is the quarter number in which 
the given week resides. The first term in the indicator equation is the mean of the benchmark 
index over the current week; the second term is the mean of the benchmark index over the 
previous quarter; and the third term is the standard deviation of the benchmark index over the 
previous quarter. If the weekly stress indicator is non-negative, the sector described by each 
index is considered in measuring the stress for the week. The logic here is that if present 
expectations are sufficiently greater than some medium-term trend in expectations, conditions in 
the represented market become stressful as the distribution of returns in the represented market 
becomes muddled to market participants. 
 
Fig. 3. Weekly reference market volatility series. 
4. Establish a weekly series of systemic stress 
As none of the four benchmark indexes represent a broad enough measure of stress to 
uniquely identify a period of systemic stress across financial markets, the indexes are combined 
into a single benchmark indicator. After the four benchmark weekly stress indicators are 
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test a trial operational definition that identifies a systemically stressful week as satisfying at least 
one of the following conditions: 
  No less than two of the benchmark indicators signal stress for the same week. 
  A single benchmark indicator signals stress for at least the second week in a row. 
To this end, we establish a combined reference binary series of weekly systemic stress 
signals based on the definition of systemic stress adapted in (1), as follows: 
    ,    
1,   , ,       ∧       , ,       ∨	     , ,       ∨	     , ,        
0,    
 (18) 
Here,   from a set of    ,   ,   ,    	is the signal threshold set to 1 std in the initial 
operational trial. Combined signals of systemic stress are found in 92 percent of the weeks from 
3Q: 1991 to 1Q: 2009, as summarized in Table 3 (panel A), using this trial operational definition. 
Table 3 
Benchmarking summary of weekly signals of systemic stress. 
PANEL A:  Benchmark  # Stress Weeks  % Stress Weeks  # Non-Stress 
Weeks 
% Non-Stress 
Weeks  Max Z 
Benchmark volatility 
series 
VIX  615 67% 302 33% 7.27 
MOVE  538 59% 379 41% 6.46 
VDAX  544 61% 342 39% 5.39 
LBOX / BBOX  382  56%  295  44%  5.97 / 3.13 
Combined 848  92%  78  8%  7.27 
PANEL B:  Benchmark  # Stress Weeks  % Stress Weeks  # Non-Stress 
Weeks 
% Non-Stress 
Weeks  Max Z 
Candidate FSI 
series 
Credit  weights  278 30% 639 70% 4.29 
Principal 
Component  320 35% 597 65% 4.55 
Equal  variance  306 33% 611 67% 5.69 
Equal  weights  265 29% 652 71% 4.98 
5. Determine the timing and origins of systemic stress episodes 
Clearly, the above trial of systemically stressful weeks is insufficient and flawed as an 
exclusive identification benchmark. To begin, there are simply too many benchmarked weekly 
volatility-based signals. This indicates that the trial operational definition above cannot 
sufficiently differentiate systemic conditions on a weekly basis. This is not altogether 
unexpected, given the intuition that weekly volatility indexes would be quite sensitive to daily 
volatility noise. One way to improve this identification is to raise the discrimination thresholds, 
for example, by increasing 1 std to 2 std; increasing the signal persistence level from two 
consecutive weeks to a greater number of weeks; or increasing the signal “resonance” from two 
concurrent markets to a greater number. Similarly, in a financial stress index series, a similar 
weekly signal series would have a different basis than that embedded in the volatility-based 35 
 
series. Since FSI is a combined CDF measure, there is no notion of magnitude when we compare 
a weekly mean to a previous quarter mean plus one standard deviation. At times, FSI movements 
will be more compact than the benchmark volatility series movements; elsewhere, FSI 
movements will be more pronounced. Evidence of this basis discrepancy can be found by 
comparing panels A and B in Table 3. A comparison of the overall duration of a stress episode, 
identified using either volatility- or stress-based methods, should be more meaningful. 
Alternatively, the above operational results may still be used to identify systemic stress 
episodes, in the spirit of Hendricks, Kambhu, and Mosser (2007) and Kambhu, Weidman, and 
Krishnan (2007): from the time the movement in the stress/risk series crosses the positive signal 
threshold to the time this movement crosses the negative signal threshold. To proceed thus, we 
identify a systemic stress episode as a period of contiguous weeks for which each week in the 
period is deemed systemically stressful. Here, the data appears more forgiving because the 
number of episodes ranges from 27 in the credit markets (using the LBOX and BBOX volatility 
indexes) to 49 in the interbank markets (using the MOVE volatility index). Over 3Q: 1991 to 1Q: 
2009 horizon, 27 such episodes are identified by the combined benchmark using 1 std 
discrimination threshold θ (see panel A in Table 4 and Table 18 in Appendix C). The basis 
difference between the volatility and stress series also disappears (see panel B in Table 4). The 
number of systemic stress episodes ranges from 28 for the equal weights series to 36 for the 
credit weights series. 
With the contiguous systemically stressful weeks and the systemic stress episodes in hand, 
one can undertake a series of statistical procedures to determine which version of FSI best tracks 
our benchmark. 
Table 4. 
Benchmarking summary of systemic stress episodes. 








Panel B:  Benchmark  # Stress Episodes 
Candidate FSI series 
Credit weights  36 
Principal Component  27 
Equal variance  30 
Equal weights  28 36 
 
6. Determine stress signals series from each candidate stress index 
Transform each alternative financial stress series into a signal in the same manner as the 
volatility benchmarks in (3). Here, it is useful to repeat this transformation for each frequency of 
the financial stress time series that is intended to be tested for monitoring, as well as for the 
quarterly series used for the EWS.
56 Each intended frequency should result in a corresponding 
signal series. The formula below gives a transformation for the weekly signal: 
     	      	      	          , ,         ,                         (19) 
7. Conduct comparative error and noise/signal analysis 
Conduct a type I/type II error analysis of alternative FSIs and compare their noise/signal 
ratios. The results of error and noise/signal analysis for weekly, FOMC, and quarterly 
frequencies are shown in Table 5 (panel A). The table shows classification results for two types 
of comparisons of the alternative weighting methods: error analysis and additional non-
parametric tests (see step 8). Volatility series are used to create a reference time series of 
systemic stress signals (steps 1–5 above). Panel A compares an error analysis of the time series 
of systemic stress episodes produced by the alternative weighting methods (step 6 above) against 
the reference time series. In this table, type I errors indicate the “failure rate” to correctly identify 
the reference systemic stress episodes; type II errors indicate the “false positive rate” in 
incorrectly identifying a reference systemic stress episode. The noise/signal ratio is defined as 
the ratio of type II errors to one minus type I errors. 
8. Conduct additional non-parametric comparative analysis 
To enable further non-parametric comparative tests
57 of the competing alternative FSIs, 
transform each FSI series into signaling grades, in which an FSI signal is graded by its z-score 
                                                            
56  SAFE EWS uses quarterly financial stress series. However, we anticipate that a higher-frequency version of a 
financial stress time series may also be useful for monitoring: weekly, bi-weekly, monthly, and between FOMC 
meetings (irregular intervals of approximately six weeks). It is optimal to choose a monitoring frequency that 
minimizes the noise/signal ratio while avoiding identification of idiosyncratic (that is, political and non-
financial) stress episodes. See section 5.5. 
57  Since FSI is essentially a relative rank-order signaling measure, selecting and benchmarking the best FSI among 
competing alternatives can be improved by non-parametric statistical tests. As a signaling measure, FSI is also 
similar to a two-dimensional rating system for systemic stress, in which a signal of a certain “grade” conveys 
information not only about the probability of systemic stress, but also about its severity. 37 
 
(number of standard deviations from the mean). Conduct additional non-parametric tests of the 
alternative stress series as grade-based rating systems of systemic stress. Our benchmarking 
process involved two additional non-parametric tests: a receiver operating characteristic (ROC) 
analysis and a Somer’s D analysis, a measure of association describing the difference of the 
conditional probabilities. Classification results for non-parametric comparisons against the 
reference series for weekly, FOMC, and quarterly frequencies are shown in Table 5 (panel B). 
Non-parametric results also include testing the null hypothesis (Ho) that the rating system 
constructed by a candidate FSI series is random. As can be seen in panel B, credit weights is the 
only candidate that can consistently reject H0 of randomness for all three frequencies while 




Results of FSI Selection Procedure. 
      CW  PC EV EW  CW  PC EV EW  CW  PC  EV  EW 
   Weekly  FOMC  Quarterly 
Panel A - 
Error 
Analysis 
Type  I  28.5% 27.4% 28.6% 29.3% 20.7% 21.5% 22.2% 21.5% 36.6%  43.7% 42.3% 45.1% 
Type  II  10.6% 12.7% 14.4% 15.7% 18.5% 19.3% 19.3% 18.5%  9.9%  7.0%  5.6%  5.6% 
Noise/Signal  14.9%  17.5% 20.2% 22.1% 23.4%  24.5% 24.8% 23.6% 15.6% 12.5%  9.8%  10.3% 
Panel B - 
Rating 
Analysis 
ROC  56.7%  54.9% 50.6% 49.3% 56.7%  56.1% 51.7% 48.4% 58.5%  56.2%  60.0%  53.2% 
SOMER's D  13.3%  9.7% 1.2% -1.4%  13.3%  12.3% 3.4% -3.2% 17.1%  12.5%  20.0%  6.4% 
H0  Yes  Yes  No No No No No No  Yes  No  Yes  No 
Note: CW – Credit Weights, PC – Principal Component, EV – Equal Variance Weights, EW – Equal Weights. 
5. CFSI results 
To summarize, CFSI is constructed as a weighted, relative rank-order signaling measure of 
observable financial stress components. Selection of the optimal CFSI weighting method 
satisfies the dual supervisory objectives of early warning system use and monitoring; it is driven 
by non-parametric statistical testing. Three tests support use of the credit-aggregates weighting 
method: type I/type II error analysis; receiver operating characteristic (ROC); and Somer’s D 
analysis. The last of these is a measure of association describing the difference in the conditional 
probabilities of observing a systemic stress episode, given groups of standardized FSI distances 
                                                            
58   Results for quarterly frequency show that equal-variance weights may be slightly superior to credit weights in 
this frequency designed for EWS use. However, the choice is unclear: both have about the same rating power. 
The error analysis for this frequency shows that equal-variance weights offer better noise/signal discrimination, 
whereas credit weights offer the least failure to identify systemic stress episodes. The choice of credit weights 
for all horizons is maintained by considerations of operational efficiency for both monitoring and EWS. 38 
 
to mean. The testing method is shown to be optimal under flexible use frequencies for 
monitoring and EWS: weekly, FOMC-meeting frequency, and quarterly. 
Fig. 4 shows the results of the credit weights financial stress index series selected as CFSI. 
Daily, weekly, monthly, and quarterly results are shown from September 1991 to March 2011. 
First, the CFSI series is reported in “levels” scaled from zero—the smallest possible stress to 
100—the largest possible stress, by contrast with the reporting of stress in standard deviations in 
Fig. 1–Fig. 3. Second, the CFSI values are continually updated (at a daily frequency) as the 
observed financial stress components evolve. This means that new observations of stress would 
change the components’ cumulative density function (CDF). Therefore, re-adjustments in the 
component CDF values would cause corresponding adjustments in the value of CFSI level at a 
given point in time. These re-adjustments are made daily and captured in adjusted CFSI levels 
that can be observed at a frequency suited to the particular CFSI use objectives. Third, Fig. 4 
provides useful insights about CFSI’s ability to differentiate idiosyncratic (that is, political and 
non-financial stress) in the markets. As the figure shows, daily CFSI captures high-frequency 
market stress, including idiosyncratic stress. Weekly CFSI is only marginally better in reducing 
the impact on CFSI of very-short-lived idiosyncratic events. Monthly and quarterly CFSI are 
significantly better at sifting out episodes of idiosyncratic events that make no lasting 
fundamental impact on market stress. 
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5.1. Dependability 
Although a review of the literature shows that the use of a stress index as a dependent 
variable in EWSs is gaining wider acceptance,
59 a better case may be made to show that the 
dependent variable constructed in this manner is, indeed, “dependable” for both monitoring and 
EWS. The key challenge in this regard is to demonstrate that a particular set of FSI frequencies, 
constructed with the optimal weighting methodology used in this study, can efficiently filter out 
idiosyncratic noise events that affect the markets temporarily. Insofar as CFSI fails to do so, a 
reasonable objection may be made that an EWS model with CFSI as a dependent variable would 
aim to predict political or non-financial events, which is neither possible nor desirable from the 
viewpoint of estimating EWS regressors. This demonstration is straightforward and illustrates 
CFSI’s ability to filter out idiosyncratic events that cause short-term market volatility (such as 
9/11, Desert Storm, the Iraq War, etc.). 
Fig. 18 and Fig. 19 in Appendix C show that the quarterly FSI index indeed possesses these 
desirable filtering characteristics, which are important for use in an EWS of systemic banking 
risk. The figures compare the filtering ability of daily, weekly, and quarterly CFSI. While higher-
frequency financial stress indexes (daily and weekly) reflect concurrent volatility during 
systemic stress episodes, both financial and idiosyncratic, the quarterly CFSI eschews 
idiosyncratic volatility, reflecting a slower accumulation of financial imbalances. 
5.2. CFSI robustness 
The use of quarterly CFSI (CFSIq) as a dependent variable in an EWS is predicated on the 
confirmation of its econometric robustness and the analysis of its time-series properties. It is well 
known that regressions of one time series on another frequently lead to high goodness-of-fit, 
even if there is no meaningful relationship between variables; this problem is known as spurious 
regression. Insofar as the statistics of a stress series follow a random walk, explaining and 
forecasting stress statistics’ future behavior becomes impossible. An EWS of systemic banking 
risk is essentially a forecasting model. Thus, the applicability of a financial stress series as a 
dependent variable in such an EWS depends strongly on verification of stationarity. If CFSIq is 
                                                            
59   See section 2 and Gramlich, Miller, Oet, and Ong (2010). 40 
 
found to be non-stationary, then the EWS researcher would need to verify cointegration before 
making further EWS model adjustments. 
In generating an EWS model that predicts financial stress, a useful question to ponder is to 
what extent a CFSIq stress series self-predicts. The first step toward answering this question is to 
determine the underlying data generation process for stress. Fig. 17 – Correlogram of quarterly 
FSI (see Appendix A) provides a summary of CFSIq’s autoregressive properties. As the CFSI 
correlogram, autocorrelation, and partial autocorrelation functions show, the effects of lagged 
levels of CFSIq tend to dissipate after six quarters. A fairly fast decline indicates that the time 
series’ long-run development is not affected beyond a certain horizon. This aspect of the 
correlogram is more consistent with a deterministic time series that has a stationary AR(1) 
component than with a nonstationary series. Thus, the decay of the autocorrelation function 
suggests a significant autoregressive component to CFSIq in absence of a moving average 
component. 
A possible reason for the autoregressive significance may be the nonstationarity of CFSIq 
time series. We conduct extensive graphical analysis—including the correlogram analysis and 
unit root tests of the quarterly CFSI series—and conclude that the quarterly series of the financial 
stress index can be considered stationary with a nonzero mean at a 5 percent critical level or 
weakly stationary around a deterministic trend at a 10 percent critical level. The results of CFSI 
stationarity testing are given Appendix B. This is a welcome finding because the process shows 
that CFSI can be used in level form as a dependent variable in a forecasting EWS. 
5.3. Decomposition of CFSI 
The dynamic weighting method by which CFSI is constructed allows for intriguing 
interpretations of economic conditions. The weights of CFSI’s four market components fluctuate 
as the structure of the financial system evolves. In turn, as these weights change (see Fig. 5), 
some market sectors become more or less pertinent relative to others. For example, the weight 
for the credit markets increased from 0.3 to 0.4 during the subprime crisis, and this sector played 
an increasing role in the change in CFSI over the crisis. Conversely, the weight for the equity 
markets decreased from nearly 0.5 in the late 1990s to roughly 0.3 in 2010. Clearly, the increase 
in equity markets played a significant role in the decrease in CFSI after the subprime crisis; 
however, this effect would have been larger if the weight had been as large as in the late 1990s. 41 
 
Fig. 6 shows the movements of specific components within the monthly CFSI, providing 
insight into the amount of stress that each of the four distinct markets contributed to the overall 
stress series. As the figure shows, over time the component from the foreign exchange market 
contributed substantially less to overall financial stress than other markets. One can also observe 
that measures from the credit, interbank, and equity markets tend to contribute significantly to 
overall financial stress. Their contributions in periods of financial stress tend to rise and fall 
together, amplifying overall changes in financial stress. The correlated behavior of stress 
components of the equity, interbank, and credit markets does have some exceptions. Consider, 
for example, the evolution of the subprime crisis of 2007–10. There was an observed initial 
stress increase in all four markets composing CFSI. As the crisis progressed and the Federal 
Reserve took extraordinary steps to mitigate this stress, CFSI shows a decrease in overall stress 
starting in April 2008. The most marked drop-offs in stress were first apparent in the CFIS’s 
equity-market stress component of CFSI, followed by stress declines in interbank and credit 
markets in 2009. A similar, but less dramatic, pattern can be observed in the latent phase of the 
LTCM crisis of 1998, as the Federal Reserve put stabilizing measures in place, first reducing 
stress in the equity markets, then relieving stress in the interbank and credit markets. 
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Fig. 6. CFSI components. 
 
It is quite useful to consider the relative contributions of the four markets in tandem with 
their volatility benchmarks. Fig. 7 focuses on the four markets’ volatility benchmarks, measured 
in terms of standard deviations from their means from 3Q: 2006 to 4Q: 2010. Three of the four
60 
volatility measures are collectively positive from September 2007 to October 2009.
61 By 
contrast, the financial stress series identifies the subprime episode differently (see Fig. 2, Fig. 4, 
and Fig. 6): from March 2007 to December 2009. The episode is identified earlier, and some 
residual stress is shown beyond the episode’s end implied by the volatility benchmarks. This 
pattern of identification is not unique to the subprime crisis; other episodes tend to be identified 
earlier and longer through stress measures rather than volatility. 
Data from 2010 shows that equity markets experienced a period of increased volatility from 
January to September, whereas other markets’ volatility diminished. In addition, credit-market 
volatility persisted from December 2009 to June 2010, while volatility in the other markets 
                                                            
60   We use the LBOX volatility series as a benchmark for credit markets up to October 2009 and the BBOX 
volatility series thereafter. 
61   Note that the choice of distance threshold is critical for timing the stress episode. If we choose one standard 
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subsided. These volatility observations are useful to a degree, but fail to provide insight as to the 
mechanism behind these volatility trends. 
This is where observations from individual components of financial stress offer substantial 
benefit. Fig. 8 and Fig. 9 decompose stress in the interbank and credit markets, respectively, 
from 2Q: 2006 to 4Q: 2010. Fig. 8 shows that in the initial phase of the subprime crisis, from 
March to July 2007, interbank markets’ stress was driven primarily by growth in the interbank 
liquidity spread and bank bond spread, later accentuated by the financial beta. The interbank cost 
of borrowing only became a factor at the height of the crisis, from March 2008 to May 2009, 
because interbank costs decreased as the Federal Reserve began decreasing the federal funds rate 
among other, less conventional tools. As the figure shows, stress in the interbank markets 
substantially subsided toward December 2009, with one exception: the interbank liquidity spread 
remained large. 
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Fig. 8. Components of stress in Interbank markets (3Q: 2006–4Q: 2010). 
 
Fig. 9 shows the components of stress in the credit markets. At the onset of the subprime 
crisis, from March to July 2007, credit markets’ change in stress was mainly driven by increases 
in the covered interest spread and the commercial paper–T-bill spread, with other spreads 
remaining relatively steady. At the height of the crisis, from March 2008 to October 2009, 
increases in the covered interest spread, corporate bond spread, and commercial paper–T-bill 
spread were the most significant, accentuated by the liquidity spread. As stress in the credit 
markets subsided toward December 2009, only the corporate bond spread and the liquidity 



























































































































Interbank Cost of Borrowing Interbank Liquidity Spread Bank Bond Spread Financial Beta45 
 
 
Fig. 9. Components of stress in credit markets (3Q: 2006–4Q: 2010). 
6. Discussion of the results 
6.1. Duration pattern of systemic stress episodes 
In this section, we present evidence of a structural connection between financial deregulation 
and the pattern of systemic-stress episodes. Drawing on the literature and our data, we argue that 
there appears to be “no free lunch” in reducing risk. Greater growth and risk reduction for 
individual institutions in good times are followed by adverse systemic risk effects in bad times. 
Our evidence suggests that the frequency of systemic-stress episodes remains consistent before 
and after U.S. financial deregulation. We observe that after deregulation, the speed of systemic 
stress propagation slows (the benefit of risk diversification for individual institutions). However, 
the length of the recovery from systemic stress also increases substantially (the penalty of 
universal banking). 
In comparing the candidate financial stress series of Fig. 1, the observer will note a 
pronounced difference in patterns of stress volatility before and after 1998. Although the 
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episodes’ duration appears substantially different. Pre-1998 stress episodes tend to be short 
relative to post-1998 episodes, which tend to dissipate more slowly.  
Additional insight into the apparent pattern in stress-episode duration can be obtained by 
considering a graph of the rate of change in various candidate financial stress series (delta ZFSI) 
per unit of time (dZFSI/dt). The physical meaning of this is the velocity of financial stress (see 
Fig. 10). It may also be useful to consider this information as a view of volatility, in the sense 
that volatility describes the variation of price over time. Higher values of velocity (volatility) of 
stress at the episode’s onset (respectively recovery) indicate faster evolution of critical states 
(respectively faster recovery). Lower values of velocity (volatility) of stress at onset 
(respectively recovery) indicate longer onset of stress (respectively slower recovery). 
 
Fig. 10. Velocity of financial stress (4Q: 1991–4Q: 2008). 
Note: Crisis bars are based on the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland’s expert survey, in which larger 
bars reflect scaled judgment of greater significance. 
 
Fig. 10 supports the observation from Fig. 1 that there may be a change in the stress pattern 
before- versus after 1998. The comparison of velocity of stress allows a view into crisis onset 
and post-crisis recovery. Pre-1998 stress velocity is characterized by sharp swings in ZCFSI prior 
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times higher at onset of crises. Post-1998 stress velocity bandwidth is roughly half: from -0.25 
std to +0.25 std, while also amplifying something like two to four times at the onset of crises. 
Fig. 1 and Fig. 10 describe a slower evolution of crises (a welcome pattern) and slower recovery 
from crises (an unwelcome pattern) after 1998. 
Further clarity can be obtained by directly considering distribution of the duration of stress 
episodes pre- and post-1998, shown in Fig. 11 and Fig. 12. Both CFSI and volatility benchmarks 
indicate a similar pattern of stress episodes’ increased duration in the post-1998 period. 
Fig. 11. Duration distribution of CFSI systemic-stress 
episodes (months). 
Fig. 12. Duration distribution of benchmark systemic-
stress episodes (quarters). 
Our evidence supports the idea that the change in pattern only affects the duration of stress 
episodes and not their frequency. Table 6 confirms the observation in Fig. 1 that the frequency of 
systemic-stress episodes remains generally consistent in pre- and post-1998 periods. 
Table 6 







Pre-1998 2.49  1.64 
Post-1998 2.06  1.65 
6.1.1. Bank deregulation and structural change 
One possible explanation for this pattern is a structural change in the U.S. financial system. 
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of financial consolidation and universal banking.
62 The U.S. Financial Services Modernization 
Act (the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act) became law in 1999, demolishing the structural separation 
that formerly existed between commercial banks, investment banks, securities firms, and 
insurance companies. One of the key beneficiaries early on was the large U.S. commercial bank 
Citicorp, whose merger with the Travelers Group insurance company, announced in 1998, was 
allowed to proceed because of the 1998 temporary rule exemption.
63 
There is a strong empirical link between regulation and systemic crises. Kemerrer (1910) 
states that between 1890 and 1908, there were 28 U.S. banking panics. Miron (1986) finds that 
prior to the creation of the Federal Reserve, banking panics in the United States were seasonal. 
Freixas and Rochet (2008) find that many financial crises worldwide have been partly initiated 
by a global movement toward financial deregulation, an argument supported by a large number 
of empirical studies of the relationship between crises and regulation. Kaminsky and Reinhart 
(1999)
64 suggest that “crises may have common origins in the deregulation of the financial 
system and the boom-bust cycles and asset bubbles that, all too often, accompany financial 
liberalization.” Caprio and Klingebiel (1996)
65 provide cross-country evidence of a natural lag 
between financial liberalization and adjustment of regulatory structure relative to supervisory 
practices; this may partially explain the link between deregulation and banking crises. Mishkin 
(1997)
66 emphasizes this point in discussing the U.S. savings and loan crisis, asserting that 
“deregulation of a financial system and rapid credit growth can be disastrous if banking 
institutions and their regulators do not have sufficient expertise to keep risk taking in check.” 
There are numerous empirical studies supporting this connection, for example McKinnon and 
Huw (1996), Sachs et al. (1996), and Weller (1999). In an extensive empirical review of U.S. 
bank deregulation, Calomiris (2000) finds that “the single most important factor in banking 
instability has been the organization of the banking industry.”
67 
In addition to the lag between the financial deregulation and regulatory adjustments cited by 
many authors, another mechanism linking deregulation and systemic risk is risk diversification. 
Universal banking allows financial intermediaries to grow larger and more diverse, enabling 
                                                            
62   See Calomiris (2000) and Wilmarth (2002). 
63   Travelers Group Inc. and Citicorp, 84 Federal Reserve Bulletin 985, 1013-14 (1998). 
64   P. 480. 
65   Pp. 24 and 30. 
66   P. 28. 
67   P. 3. 49 
 
them to benefit from more efficient portfolio diversification to take larger risk. After the Glass–
Steagall Act of 1993 and the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 and preceding the financial 
deregulation of 1999, U.S. financial intermediaries were not allowed to become universal banks. 
Calomiris examines U.S. and German universal banking history during the 1870–1914 period 
and concludes, from the evidence, “that German industrial growth was helped, and American 
growth was hindered, by their respective financial systems.”
68 Modern finance portfolio theory 
offers an intuitive explanation for this growth. From the viewpoint of an individual universal 
bank, a larger and more diverse bank is more insulated from the risk of failure and, thus, could 
be individually “safer.” Paradoxically, as more institutions become larger and universally alike, 
once crisis sets in, contagion among institutions can be expected to persist longer and recovery 
can be expected to take more time. This is indeed the pattern observed above in Fig. 1, Fig. 10, 
Fig. 12, Fig. 14, and Table 6. The apparent safety of an individual large, diversified financial 
institution is also a source of moral hazard and an implicit too-big-to-fail subsidy. Critics of the 
Financial Modernization Act have argued that institution-specific benefit in portfolio 
diversification would be offset by the increase in systemic risk that would accompany the growth 
of universal banks. Reviewing studies of systemic risk in a post-deregulation era, Wilmarth 
(2002) writes that “doubts about the claimed advantages of universal banks are buttressed by 
concerns that financial conglomeration will aggravate the problem of systemic risk in financial 
markets.” 
We can deduce that the structural break occurred approximately during the announcement 
and implementation of the U.S. Financial Services Modernization Act. A formal test is 
appropriate to interpret the break empirically. We use the Quandt likelihood ratio statistic
69 to 
test for breaks at all dates within the 15-percent trimmed monthly time series. We consider the 
first-order difference equation with one lag of ZCFSI to test for a structure break. 
As Fig. 13 shows, the maximum Quandt likelihood-ratio statistic occurs in May 1998 (F-statistic 
= 9.007), which is statistically significant at a 1 percent critical value. This is a welcome result 
because the Financial Services Act was passed by the Senate precisely at this time, leading up to 
the U.S. Financial Services Modernization Act later in the year. 
                                                            
68   P. 265. 
69   Quandt (1960). 50 
 
 
Fig. 13 Quandt likelihood-ratio testing for structural break in ZCFSI. 
6.2. Comparisons of CFSI with currently available alternates 
Since 2009, development of U.S. financial stress measures has been an expanding area of 
research. Currently, as many as 12 new financial stress indexes of varying frequency are 
available. Table 7 and Fig. 14 summarize the currently available alternative series of financial 
stress, comparing their Z-scores from December 1991 through December 2009. A comparative 
visual assessment of CFSI against alternative series is promising for CFSI: it tends to distinctly 
identify stress episodes (see, for example, the period from 4Q: 1991 to 4Q: 1998) and seems to 
do so earlier than competing indexes (this is clear in the LTCM crisis of 1998 or the subprime 
crisis of 2007). 



























































































































































































































































F-statistic = 9.00751 
 
Table 7 
2010 Summary of Alternative Financial Stress Series. 
Index Source  Frequency  Construction  Components 
CFSI  FRBC  d, w, m, FOMC, q  U.S. credit weights   12 
SLF FSI  FRBSL   w, m, FOMC, q  Principal components  18 
KCFSINDX  FRBKC   m, q  Principal components  11 
WRAISTRS  Bloomberg  d, w, m, FOMC, q  Equal weights  7 
HSCLOG  Bloomberg  d, w, m, FOMC, q  Equal weights  4 
BFCIUS  Bloomberg  d, w, m, FOMC, q  Equal weights  10 
Deutsche Bank FCI 
http://www.princeton.edu 
/~mwatson/ 
q  Weighted Σ of principal components  7 
OECD FCI  q  U.S. GDP weighted Σ 6 
MacAdv FCI  q  Δ U.S. GDP impulse response  5 
GS FCI  m, q  U.S. macro model weights  4 
Citi FCI  m, q  U.S. CB weights  6 
Mishkin FCI  m, q  Principal components  45 
Note: Frequencies are designated as follows: d-daily, w-weekly, m-monthly, q-quarterly. FOMC designation 
indicates that available data can match FOMC meeting schedule. 
 
 
Fig. 14. Comparative summary of alternative financial stress series. 
Fig. 15 briefly summarizes this comparison, considering CFSI only against alternative high-
frequency financial stress series. It is useful to compare the alternative series, both to assess the 
relative quality of CFSI and to discover areas for possible future enhancement. In comparing the 
relative performances of the alternative indexes, we follow the formal process described in 
section 4.3. At the time of this writing, we had completed the first seven elements of this process 
but not the monthly error analysis. Table 8 and Table 9 show the results weekly and quarterly 
error analysis, respectively. Several comments should be made about these results. First, CFSI 
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best, but not the worst. Second, any observer of Fig. 15 would react to this result with some 
incredulity: After all, CFSI clearly picks historically relevant stress episodes that are not picked 
up by other indexes. How then could its noise-signal results not reflect this? Third, the key to 
explanation is in the component composition of CFSI and alternative indexes. The CFSI is a 
“true” stress index, only admitting stress components directly observable in the markets. By 
contrast, the construction of its competitors directly includes one or more market volatility 
indexes. The error-analysis against volatility-based episodes thus becomes a biased test and 
should not be seriously considered. 
 




Error analysis - Monitoring weekly signals. 
Method  Observations  Type I error (%) 
“failure rate” 




CFSI   911  29%  11%  16% 
FRBSL FSI   856  26%  6%  8% 
WRAISTRS   648  26%  13%  18% 
HSCLOG   178 12% 11% 12% 
BFCIUS   1013  36%  26%  41% 
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Table 9 
Error analysis - Monitoring quarterly signals. 
Method  Observations  Type I error (%) 
“failure rate” 




CFSI   70  19%  14%  18% 
FRBSL FSI   66  18%  8%  9% 
FRBKC FSI   74  20%  11%  14% 
WRAISTRS    50  22% 20% 26% 
HSCLOG   14  7%  7%  8% 
BFCIUS    78  32% 28% 42% 
 
7. Applications of CFSI 
The two major supervisory applications of CSFI are monitoring and forecasting financial 
systemic stress. For both, it is reasonable to consider using CFSI in conjunction with alternative 
stress indexes. This is consistent with the EWS design principle of using different models in 
parallel.
70 This practice would certainly raise questions of interpretation insofar as different 
stress indexes disagree or result in different forecasts. To the supervisor, this disagreement is not 
unwelcome; it requires consideration of the reasons why a particular index indicates stress or 
leads to forecasts of systemic stress in an EWS setting, whereas another does not. We believe 
that instead of avoiding the difficult problem of interpreting such mixed signals, the supervisor 
should confront the possibility that a different type of systemic stress may be highlighted and 
consider it carefully. 
7.1. Use as a dependent variable for early warning system 
An important application of CFSI or similar stress indexes is as a dependent variable in an 
early warning system of systemic stress. We discuss our implementation of this idea in a parallel 
paper (Oet, Eiben, Gramlich, Miller, and Ong, 2011). In this approach, we build on existing 
micro- and macroprudential early warning systems to propose a hybrid set of models for 
systemic risk, incorporating the structural characteristics of the financial system and its feedback 
mechanisms. In this EWS setting, we explain CFSI by means of data from five large bank 
holding companies and regress institutional imbalances (constructed as Z-scores) using an 
optimal lag method. Our EWS utilizes both public and proprietary supervisory data and monitors 
                                                            
70   For systemic-risk EWS design principles, see Gramlich, Miller, Oet, and Ong (2010). 54 
 
microprudential information from systemically important institutions to anticipate build‐up of 
systemic stress, captured by CFSI, in the financial markets at large. For the supervisor, this 
CSFI-based early warning system provides a toolkit of possible institutional supervisory actions 
that can be used to diffuse the build‐up of systemic stress in the financial markets. As in our 
investigation of appropriate action thresholds for monitoring (see section 7.2), we investigate and 
suggest levels for action thresholds appropriate for this EWS. 
7.1.1. Data Considerations 
Data considerations for the dependent variable in an EWS include two key concerns: 
overcoming data-quality issues; and selecting criteria for possible inclusion of additional data 
indicators. 
Data quality issues typically result from the limited availability of data indicators and the 
emergence of new data. Hatzius et al. (2010) make an important contribution to this problem by 
applying unbalanced panel-estimation techniques and enabling significant extension of the 
constructed time series.
71 
No clear theory exists for inclusion criteria regarding additional data indicators, although 
precedents and current research lend significant insights for further identification of relevant 
indicators.
72 Clearly, because CFSI intends to capture increases in systemwide stress, 
incorporating data from markets beyond the four already included (interbank, credit, equity, and 
foreign exchange) may be important and deserves further investigation. High-frequency 
additions from property markets and risk-transfer markets are the most obvious possibilities. 
Changes in property values reflect a wealth argument for increased stress. Insofar as demand 
shocks cause property values to fall, these markets become more illiquid in the short run, thus 
increasing demand for funds, which leads to increased stress. Disequilibria in risk-transfer 
markets may imply reluctance to bear risk that results from increased uncertainty, thus elevating 
stress as proportionately more risk is mispriced in the short run. 
                                                            
71   Application of the unbalanced panel technique should be even more critical in overcoming data-quality issues in 
independent variables. 
72  Development of the CFSI series was the only option for SAFE EWS in early 2009. At the time of this writing, 
as many as 12 distinct financial stress indexes are available. Key among the recent research contributions are 
studies by Hakkio and Keeton (2009), Hatzius et al. (2010), and Kliesen and Smith (2010). 55 
 
This study’s use of financial beta may be refined by examining the volatility of the worst-
performing quintile or decile relative to the S&P 500 index. Utilizing the so-called tail beta 
approach is appealing because it identifies the banks whose performance is most sensitive to 
broad-based declines in business profitability and which therefore signals stress more 
pronouncedly. It may also be useful to enhance the set of volatility benchmarks used to validate 
modifications of CFSI, for example, by finding a more suitable volatility proxy for foreign 
exchange markets or adding volatility benchmarks specific to a financial institution, for example, 
the Philadelphia Stock Exchange KBW Bank Index.
73 
7.1.2. Technical Considerations 
A principal technical challenge for a dependent variable is correct identification of its 
intended objective. In particular, the EWS researcher seeks a financial stress series that is, 
indeed, “dependable” for measuring stress episodes and crisis conditions. Critically, the fact that 
some aggregate measure of financial stress may be constructed or found is not sufficient basis for 
using it as a dependent variable in a systemic stress EWS. One approach to this problem, 
established in practice, is to set a threshold for the series’ noise/signal ratio
74 and select an 
alternative series that minimizes this ratio. Through CFSI, the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Cleveland SAFE EWS extends this approach by benchmarking against disjoint and aggregate 
signals of financial markets’ volatility. Moreover, this technique enables timing identification of 
stress episodes and rigorous selection among alternative stress series. 
There are several technical issues for continued refinement of CFSI. An important proposal 
would be to identify structural breaks in the relationships between components of CFSI in order 
to improve the weights’ dynamic over time. 
7.2. Monitoring financial stress 
As a monitoring tool, CFSI’s main benefit is to provide insights on stress in a number of 
financial markets. A meaningful reading of CFSI rides on the underlying requirement that there 
                                                            
73   If a volatility index is included as a sub-component of financial stress, the researcher should be careful to 
exclude it from the benchmarking schema to avoid bias. 
74  Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), Borio and Lowe (2002, Asset), Borio and Lowe (2002, Crises), Borio (2003), 
Borio and Drehmann (2009). Alternative benchmarking approaches can be found in Illing and Liu (2003, 2006) 
and Hatzius et al. (2010). Illing and Liu (2003, 2006) use the rank-ordering results of an expert survey. Hatzius 
et al. (2010) use efficacy in tracking future GDP growth. 56 
 
is no aggregate noise in the index. Yet, noise is always present in the financial markets. 
Therefore, the “no aggregate noise” rule entails the assumption that uncorrelated simultaneous 
stress in the normally functioning markets tends to be arbitraged away through interconnections 
and transfers between these markets. When this assumption holds, any remaining stress may 
indicate a structural ailment in the markets that may not be quickly or easily arbitraged away 
through normal markets’ function. 
The problem of index noise is also known as spurious correlation. An index change can 
result from a purely accidental co-movement of components or from some underlying cause. An 
increase in the index is seen as an indication of a probable increase in underlying stress, although 
coincidence is always an underlying explanation. For example, the same stress index, taken on 
two consecutive days, may represent two vastly different levels of stress. One day’s stress may 
be fueled by spurious coincidences in different markets, while another’s day’s is driven by 
correlated events arising from a common structural cause. Thus, using CFSI at a very high 
frequency, such as daily, entails the hazard of including too much noise. On the other hand, using 
CFSI at a very low frequency, such as annual, becomes questionable because of the interim 
evolution and transformation of the financial markets. To summarize, in using and interpreting 
CFSI, it is important to keep in mind that the aggregate stress index is, at best, only a relative 
weathervane of directional change in aggregate stress. Knowledge of such directional change in 
CFSI sheds light on monitoring systemic stress and helps us estimate the probability that a given 
event is economically meaningful. 
7.2.1. Seeking optimal index frequency 
The choice of an optimal monitoring frequency using CFSI is sensitive to several 
considerations, the most significant being its ability to filter out idiosyncratic stress episodes. An 
unbiased evaluation of CFSI’s filtering properties requires appropriate independent benchmarks. 
Because CFSI encompasses high-frequency data from four markets, benchmarks that match 
these markets and frequency are preferred. The volatility benchmarks can be used to create a set 
of binary stress signals of varying frequency. In these signals, the existence of stress is indicated 
by volatility indexes that mirror the four markets in CFSI construction. The following volatility 
indexes are employed in constructing the binary stress signals: VIX, MOVE, VDAX, LBOX, 
and BBOX. 57 
 
We consider an individual market to be in stress if the level of its volatility index surpasses a 
predetermined threshold. For example, a stress signal may be indicated by the difference in the 
Z-scores of the individual volatility indexes exceeding ¼ standard deviation. Alternatively, use 
of ½ standard deviations as a signaling threshold would lead to a different binary series. Which is 
better? Theoretical precedent for answering this question has been established by earlier research 
that used the signaling method.
75 By comparing signaling outcomes for various volatility 
thresholds, we can establish a set of thresholds that minimizes idiosyncratic episodes in a given 
time period. 
This method also allows accommodation of structural breaks in a given time period. For 
example, as discussed in section 6.1, empirical data on frequency and duration of stress episodes 
as well as historical evidence of U.S. financial deregulation suggest that the 1998 period may 
constitute a structural break that has affected the duration—but not the frequency—of systemic 
stress episodes. For this reason, it is appropriate to explicitly include a structure break in the 
binary stress series derived from the four markets. A more restrictive threshold of ½ standard 
deviation can be used for the period 4Q: 1991–Q1: 1998; a less restrictive threshold of ¼ 
standard deviation can be used for the period 2Q: 1998–4Q: 2010. 
We apply the signaling technique consistently, using the process described in section 4.3 (4). 
Stress in one market does not necessarily indicate widespread stress. We consider the system to 
be in stress if more than one market sends a signal based on these restrictions or if any market 
signals stress for consecutive periods. These criteria can be applied at various frequencies to 
optimally filter out idiosyncratic episodes that do not warrant policy actions. According to these 
guidelines, daily measures are far too impulsive to permit drawing any cogent conclusions; 
consequently, we test filtering capability at weekly, biweekly, monthly, and quarterly 
frequencies for both measures of stress; the results are shown in Table 10. 
Table 10 
Benchmarked stress episodes as a function of monitoring frequency. 
Frequency  Stress Episodes  Non-Stress Episodes 
Quarterly 8  69 
Monthly 16  215 
Biweekly 6  497 
Weekly 12  995 
                                                            
75   Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart (1998), Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996, 1999), Borio and Lowe (2002, Asset), 
Borio and Lowe (2002, Crises), Borio and Drehmann (2009). 58 
 
It is not sufficient to simply create a benchmark series of stress signals. To determine the 
optimal monitoring regime using CFSI, we proceed to establish and test alternative CFSI-based 
systems for rating systemic stress. The optimal system can facilitate monitoring and guide the 
interpretation of systemic stress, as in Bordo’s use of five grade ranges in the Financial 
Conditions Index. Furthermore, the rating approach can help determine the optimal CFSI 
monitoring frequency. 
7.2.2. CFSI as a rating system: Classifying grades of stress thresholds 
The logic of a CFSI-based rating system is as follows: When the CFSI has a low Z-score, it is 
unlikely that we are experiencing a stress episode; when the Z-score is high, it is more likely; and 
when it is moderate, the diagnosis is unclear. As a result, a CFSI rating system that effectively 
differentiates Z-score ranges vis-à-vis frequency of observation can be ideal for selecting optimal 
monitoring frequencies and for policy making. 
To construct such a system, we divide the range of the Z-score of CFSI into grades, 
determine how many observations fall into each grade, and compare those observations to the 
benchmark binary stress series. We use two metrics for the effectiveness of the rating system: 
Somer’s D and the area under the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve. Somer’s D is a 
broad metric that shows the degree to which a low rating within the system contains more stress 
events. 
       ′ 	   
2 
        	                  	       	                	                  	       	       	
    1  (20) 
The area under the ROC curve is a measure of the rating system’s differentiating power. For 
a perfect rating system, the ROC statistic measures 100, while ROC for a rating system that is no 
better than random measures 50. 
The results of testing are shown in Table 11. The optimal number of grades depends on the 
frequency chosen. Overall, it is clear that the rating system at a monthly frequency with four 
grades is optimal: It has an ROC of 85.6 and a Somer’s D of 77.1; it is not equivalent to a 
random rating system at 5 percent significance. 
  59 
 
Table 11 
Results of non-parametric testing for optimal CFSI-based rating system. 
    # of grades=2  # of grades=3  # of grades=4  # of grades=5 
Quarterly Somer’s  D  31.2  55.4* 49.8* 48*
 
 ROC  66  77.7 74.9* 74*
 
Monthly Somer’s  D  59.6*
  52.2* 77.1* 54.5*
 
 ROC  79.8*
  76.1* 85.6* 77.3*
 
Biweekly Somer’s  D  17.4 40.2 39.4 33.5 
 ROC  58.7 71.1 69.7 66.7 
Weekly Somer’s  D  21.9  44.1* 42* 51.4*
 
 ROC  60.9 72* 71* 75.7*
 
*Indicates rating system is not equivalent to a random rating system 
7.2.3. Application of the CFSI rating system to quantifying the probability of stress episodes 
Because we have determined that the optimal number of grades for the rating system is four 
and the optimal threshold is ½ standard deviation through 1997 and ¼ standard deviation 
thereafter, we can look toward to applying these specifications. The continuous CFSI series can 
predict a stress episode based on the external stress series that has been constructed. To do so, we 
have used a probit model to obtain the implied probability of a stress episode. This could be 
beneficial for policy as well as future modeling. This model takes the form of 
          	            	  	   (21) 
          	 1.9929115   0.524282     	  	    (22) 
The regression results are shown in tables 16 and 17 in Appendix C. On the basis of these 
parameters, we can create a continuous series of the implied probability of a stress episode as 
measured by the external benchmark series of stress (see Table 12 and Fig. 16). As of 4Q: 2010, 
the range of CFSI Z-scores was divided into grades; the minimum thresholds were 2.38 (grade 
4); 0.82 (grade 3); –0.73 (grade 2); and –0.74 (grade 1) A higher grade implies a greater 
probability of stress; it is clear that the probability of a systemic stress episode has decreased 
significantly since the peak of the subprime crisis. 
In comparison with Bordo, Dueker, and Wheelock’s (2000) conjecture for severely and 
moderately distressed thresholds, our results indicate the need to revise the recommended 
thresholds. Moderate distress threshold should increase from 0.75 standard deviations to 0.82 
standard deviations. Severe distress threshold should increase from 1.5 standard deviations to 
2.38 standard deviations, based on the monthly CFSI series in the period between 4Q: 1991and 
4Q: 2010. 60 
 
Table 12 
Probability of systemic stress episode by CFSI grade. 
CFSI 
rating grades  Range  Probability of systemic stress 
at grade threshold 
Grade 1  ZCFSI ≤ -0.74  0.07% 
Grade 2  -0.74 < ZCFSI < 0.82  0.87% 
Grade 3  0.82 < ZCFSI < 2.38  5.92% 
Grade 4  ZCFSI ≥ 2.38  22.84% 
 
 
Fig. 16. Implied probability of systemic stress episode. 
7.3. Crisis dating 
The signaling process described above can be used to establish an objective method of crisis 
dating. The population of stress episodes determined by this method will vary according to the 
choices of signaling thresholds and frequency. Table 18 in Appendix C lists the stress episodes 
determined in the initial selection of credit weights by the CFSI construction method. During this 
process, a threshold of 1 standard deviation at weekly frequency was used. As discussed in 
section 7.2, a more efficient stress episode filtering occurs at a monthly frequency using ½ 
standard deviation during the period from 4Q:1991 to 1Q: 1998 and ¼ standard deviation 
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Appendix A. Description of data 
Table 13 
Financial stress index data sources. 
INDICATOR DATA  SOURCE  VARIABLE  START  DATE 
INTERBANK MARKETS     
Financial Beta 
Beta (S&P Financial & S&P 500)  Calculated: BLOOMBERG data  BETA  09/13/1990 
S&P 500 Financials Total Return Index  BLOOMBERG (SPTRFINL Index)  SP500_F  09/13/1990 
S&P 500 Total Return Index  BLOOMBERG (SPXT Index)  SP500  02/9/1988 
Bank Bond Spread 
(10 Year A Bank Bond Index)-(10YT-Notes)  Calculated: BLOOMBERG & FRED 
data  A_TN_S 09/26/1991 
10 Year A Bank Bond Index  BLOOMBERG (C07010Y Index)  A_10Y  09/26/1991 
10-year constant maturity Treasury Rate  FRED (DGS10)  T_10Y  01/02/1962 
Interbank Liquidity Spread 
TED Spread (3mo LIBOR - 3mo Tbill)  Calculated: BLOOMBERG (US0003m), 
FRED (DTB3)  TED_S 01/02/1985* 
3 mo LIBOR rate  BLOOMBERG (US0003m)  3moL  01/02/1985* 
US 90-day Treasury bill: Secondary Market Rate  FRED (DTB3)  3moTB  01/04/1954 
Interbank Cost of Borrowing 
3mo LIBOR-FedFundsTargetRate Spread  Calculated: BLOOMBERG (US0003m, 
FDTR)  L_FFR_S 01/02/1985* 
3 mo LIBOR rate  BLOOMBERG (US0003m)  3moL  01/02/1985* 
Fed Funds Target rate  BLOOMBERG (FDTR)  FFR  01/02/1985* 
FX MARKETS       
Weighted Dollar Crashes 
Weighted Dollar Crashes vs. Major Currency FX  Calculated, FRED (DTWEXM)  WTD_DCR  01/02/1973 
Trade Weighted $US Exchange Index: Major Currencies  FRED (DTWEXM)  DX_IND  01/02/1973 
CREDIT MARKETS       
Covered Interest Spread 
US-UK covered interest rate differential  BOE and FRED (DTB3)  UKUS_90S  01/02/1979 
UK 90-day Treasury bill rate  BOE Website  UK_90  01/31/1975 
90-day forward rate for the UK-US exchange rate  BOE Website  UKUS_90F  01/02/1979 
Spot rate for the UK-US dollar exchange rate  BOE Website  UKUS_S  01/02/1975 
U.S. Government 90-day Treasury bill rate (secondary market 
rate)  FRED (DTB3)  US_90  01/04/1954 
Corporate Bond Spread 
Moody's Seasoned Aaa Corporate Bond Yield - 10-Year T Note  FRED (DAAA - DGS10)  AAA10Y_S  01/03/1983 
Moody’s Aaa Corporate Bond Yield  FRED (DAAA)  AAA10Y  01/03/1983 
10-year constant maturity Treasury Rate  FRED (DGS10)  T_10Y  01/02/1962 
Liquidity Spread 
30-day Moving Average of 3 Month U.S. Treasuries Bid-Ask 
Spread  Calculated, BLOOMBERG (USGG3M)  LIQ_S  01/02/1985* 
3 Month U.S. Treasuries Generic Index Bid Price  BLOOMBERG (USGG3M)  US90_B  06/17/1983 
3 Month U.S. Treasuries Generic Index Ask Price  BLOOMBERG (USGG3M)  US90_A  06/17/1983 
Bid-Ask spread on 90-day U.S. government Treasury bills  Calculated, BLOOMBERG (USGG3M)  TB_BA_S  06/17/1983 
Commercial Paper - T-Bill Spread 
(AA Commercial Paper) - (3 Month Treasury Bill Secondary 
Market Rate) 
Calculated, FRED (DCPN3M U 
WCP3M - DTB3)  AACPTB_S 01/02/1985* 
90-day commercial paper AA (patched)  Patched data, FRED (DCPN3M and 
WCP3M)  AACP_90 04/09/1971 
US 90-day Treasury bill: Secondary Market Rate  FRED (DTB3)  US_90  01/04/1954 
Treasury Yield Curve Spread 
30-day Moving Average of 10 Year Treasuries - 3-month T-Bills  Calculated, FRED (DGS10, DTB3)  TREAS_S  02/01/1984* 
10-Year Treasury Note Yield at Constant Maturity (Avg. % p.a.)   FRED (DGS10)  T_10Y  01/02/1962 
U.S. Government 90-day Treasury bill rate (secondary market 
rate)  FRED (DTB3)  US_90  01/04/1954 
3-Month Treasury: Sec. Mkt Rate, Bond Equivalent Yield  Calculated, FRED (DTB3)  US_90_BE  01/03/1984* 
EQUITY MARKETS       
Stock Market Crashes 
Stock Market Crashes - S&P 500 Financials  Calculated, BLOOMBERG (S5FINL 
Index)  STMC_SPF 09/10/1990 
S&P 500 Financials Price Index  BLOOMBERG (S5FINL Index)  STPI_SPF  09/11/1989 
*  Start data set by data request specification.   66 
 
Table 14 
FSI construction: risk assignments and variable names. 
INDICATOR RANK  NAME  RANK OF HIGHEST OBSERVED 
VALUE  CDF NAME 
Financial beta  RKFSI1A  4,237  CDFIS1A 
Bank bond spread  RKFSI2E  4,237  CDFIS2E 
Interbank liquidity spread  RKFSI10A  4,237  CDFIS10A 
Interbank cost of borrowing  RKFSI11A  4,237  CDFIS11A 
Weighted dollar crashes  RKFSI3A  1  CDFIS3A 
Covered interest spread  RKFSI4A  4,237  CDFIS4A 
Corporate bond spread  RKFSI5A  4,237  CDFIS5A 
Liquidity spread  RKFSI6A  4,237  CDFIS6A 
Commercial paper/T-Bill spread  RKFSI7A  4,237  CDFIS7A 
Treasury yield curve spread  RKFSI8A  1  CDFIS8A 




Fig. 17. Correlogram of quarterly FSI. 
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Appendix B. Stationarity of quarterly CFSI 
Since nonstationary process may be due to a random walk, random walk with drift, or 
random walk with drift around a stochastic trend. We conduct several econometric tests for the 
three different forms under three different null hypotheses: 
  Case 1. Test quarterly CFSIt as a random walk:  
                          
  Case 2. Test quarterly CFSIt as a random walk with drift 
                              
  Case 3. Test quarterly CFSIt as a random walk with drift around a stochastic trend. 
                                    
In each case, the null hypothesis is that   0 , that is there is a unit root and time series is 
nonstationary: 
 
  :	    0	|	    	      	  	             
  :	    0	|	    	      	  	            
If the null hypothesis is rejected for case 1, then CFSIt is stationary with a zero mean. If the 
null hypothesis is rejected for case 2, then CFSIt is stationary with a nonzero mean. If the null 
hypothesis is rejected for case 3, then CFSIt is stationary around a deterministic trend. As Table 
15 shows, quarterly CFSIt can be considered stationary with a nonzero mean at 5% critical level, 
or weakly stationary around a deterministic trend at 10% critical level. 
Table 15 
Unit Root tests of quarterly CFSIt 
Unit Root tests    DF  ADF  PP  KPSS  ERS  NP 
   MZa  MZt  MSB  MPT 
CFSIt as a random walk 
Test statistic     -0.62 -0.56 
critical values 
1% level  -0.60 -2.60 
5% level  -1.95 -1.95 
10% level  -1.61 -1.61 
CFSIt as a random walk 
with drift 
Test  statistic    -2.55 -0.62 -2.72 0.40  2.23  -11.1  -2.36  0.21  2.20 
critical values 
1%  level  -2.60 -3.52 -3.52 0.74  1.91  -13.80 -2.58  0.10  1.78 
5%  level  -1.95 -2.90 -2.90 0.46  3.04  -8.10  -1.98  0.23  3.17 
10%  level  -1.61 -2.59 -2.59 0.35  4.05  -5.70  -1.62  0.28  4.45 
CFSIt as a random walk 
with drift around a 
stochastic trend 
Test  statistic    -2.91 -2.89 -3.11 0.06  6.56  -14.00 -2.62  0.19  6.66 
critical values 
1%  level  -3.68 -4.09 -4.09 0.22  4.24  -23.80 -3.42  0.14  4.03 
5%  level  -3.11 -3.47 -3.47 0.15  5.68  -17.30 -0.91  0.10  5.48 
10%  level  -2.82  3.16 -3.16  0.12 6.78 -14.20  -2.62  0.19  6.67 
Note: DF – Dickey Fuller test; ADF – Augmented Dickey Fuller test; ERS – Elliott-Rothenberg-Stock test; PP – 
Phillips-Perron test; KPSS – Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin test; NP – Ng-Perron test. 
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Appendix C. CFSI properties 
Table 16. 
Regression results of monthly CFSI-based rating system. 
Variable Coefficient  Std.  Error  z-Statistic  Prob. 
CFSI Z 0.524282  0.117728 4.453346 0.0000
C -1.992915  0.209251 -9.524046 0.0000
McFadden R-squared 0.208572  Mean  dependent var 0.069264
S.D. dependent var 0.254454  S.E.  of  regression 0.232642
Akaike info criterion  0.415770  Sum squared resid 12.39400
Schwarz criterion  0.445575  Log likelihood -46.02146
Hannan-Quinn criter.  0.427791  Deviance 92.04291
Restr. deviance  116.2998  Restr. log likelihood -58.14990
LR statistic 24.25688  Avg. log likelihood -0.199227
Prob(LR statistic) 0.000001 
Obs with Dep=0 215  Total  obs 231
Obs with Dep=1 16 
Table 17 
Granger test precedence results of alternative stress indexes vs. volatility series. 
CFSI = FSICW   FSIEVW FSIEW FSIFA 
Obs  F-Statistic  Prob.   Obs F-Statistic Prob.  Obs F-Statistic Prob.   Obs  F-Statistic Prob. 
QUARTERLY (lags=2) 
FSI --> BBOX  32  3.56471  0.0423††  24  3.70077  0.0439  24 5.07458 0.0171††  24  4.63041 0.023††
FSI --> LBOX  52  1.1284  0.3322  50 2.50094 0.0933†† 50  1.87745  0.1648  50  1.80398  0.1763 
FSI --> MOVE  75  1.39051  0.2557  67  0.9235  0.4025  67  0.89577  0.4135†  67  1.27585  0.2864† 
FSI --> VDAX  73  0.39496  0.6752  65  0.00417  0.9958  65  0.01729  0.9829  65  0.09867  0.9062 
FSI --> VIX  75  0.01732  0.9828  67  0.06357  0.9385  67  0.12878  0.8794  67  0.59341  0.5555 
                                   
BBOX --> FSI  32  0.0978 0.9072††  24  1.48745  0.2511  24 0.44086 0.6499††  24  0.08663 0.9174††
LBOX --> FSI  52  0.91645  0.407  50 0.66771 0.5179†† 50  1.08596  0.3463  50  5.13669  0.0098 
MOVE --> FSI  75  0.82354  0.4431  67  0.08121  0.9221  67  0.18482  0.8317†  67  0.52872  0.592† 
VDAX --> FSI  73  1.72123  0.1865  65  0.0836  0.9199  65  0.06992  0.9325  65  0.07724  0.9258 
VIX --> FSI  75  0.60951  0.5465  67  0.52715  0.5929  67  0.53806  0.5866  67  0.14379  0.8664 
MONTHLY (lags=2) 
FSI --> BBOX  102  2.44857  0.0917††  78 3.59052 0.0326†† 78 3.96121 0.0233††  78  4.82196 0.0108††
FSI --> LBOX  162  1.83975  0.1623  156  2.7154  0.0694†  156  2.00492  0.1382  156  1.36427  0.2587 
FSI --> MOVE  231  1.23157  0.2938†  207  1.06766  0.3457†  207  0.19455  0.8234†  207  0.49647  0.6094 
FSI --> VDAX  227  0.93624  0.3936  203  0.14794  0.8626  203  0.64809  0.5241  203  0.48729  0.615 
FSI --> VIX  231  1.10481  0.3331  207  0.18631  0.8302  207  0.80026  0.4506  207  1.29159  0.2771 
                                   
BBOX --> FSI  102  0.0832 0.9202††  78 0.6996 0.5001†† 78 0.2398 0.7874††  78  0.60011 0.5514††
LBOX --> FSI  162  2.12791  0.1225  156  1.0253  0.3612†  156  2.44035  0.0906  156  5.33357  0.0058 
MOVE --> FSI  231  0.31635  0.7291†  207  0.27221  0.762†  207  0.35783  0.6996  207  1.308  0.2726 
VDAX --> FSI  227  1.80085  0.1676  203  4.53028  0.0119  203  1.80141  0.1678  203  2.80737  0.0628 
VIX --> FSI  231  3.094  0.0472  207  6.27212  0.0023  207  3.34824  0.0371  207  4.32203  0.0145 
WEEKLY (lags=2) 
FSI --> BBOX  454  1.58082  0.2069††  351  3.79732  0.0234  351  2.7948  0.0625†  351  3.27128 0.0391††
FSI --> LBOX  711  6.93859  0.001††  689  3.97751  0.0192†  689  7.75419  0.0005  689  3.93679  0.02 
FSI --> MOVE  1013  4.2798 0.0141††  910 2.17712 0.114†† 910  1.02608  0.3588  910  1.57649  0.2073† 
FSI --> VDAX  1000  0.00941  0.9906  897  1.04032  0.3538  897  0.6002  0.5489  897  0.11188  0.8942 
FSI --> VIX  1013  0.04918  0.952  910  0.16007  0.8521  910  0.20765  0.8125  910  0.71705  0.4885 
                                   
BBOX --> FSI  454  0.03664  0.964††  351  1.69379  0.1853  351  0.81867  0.4419†  351  0.37883 0.6849††
LBOX --> FSI  711  0.25426  0.7756††  689  1.0077  0.3656†  689  2.42864  0.0889  689  3.99666  0.0188 
MOVE --> FSI  1013  0.62025  0.538  910 0.19263 0.8248†† 910  0.68708  0.5033  910  0.36572  0.6938† 
VDAX --> FSI  1000  2.4502  0.0868  897  2.22256  0.1089  897  1.57922  0.2067  897  1.6318  0.1962 
VIX --> FSI  1013  3.45097  0.0321  910  3.21946  0.0404  910  2.16228  0.1157  910  3.11983  0.0446 
DAILY (lags=2) 
FSI --> BBOX  2286  3.03456  0.0483††  1768  8.3364  0.0002  1768  4.78798  0.0084  1768  5.22381 0.0055††
FSI --> LBOX  3567  2.97617  0.0511††  3454  2.40363  0.0905†  3454  1.36663  0.2551  3454  0.7728  0.4618 
FSI --> MOVE  5081  7.97978  0.0003††  4563  2.93107  0.0534  4563  0.49054  0.6123  4563  0.85684  0.4246 
FSI --> VDAX  5013  41.704  0.0000  4495  2.86819  0.0569  4495  2.45547  0.0859  4495  2.59337  0.0749 
FSI --> VIX  5081  3.74891  0.0236  4563  2.46105  0.0855  4563  2.01197  0.1338  4563  4.07116  0.0171 
BBOX --> FSI  2286  0.19844  0.82††  1768  3.98716  0.0187  1768  1.47854  0.2283  1768  0.77944 0.4588††
LBOX --> FSI  3567  0.74201  0.4762††  3454  1.01153  0.3638†  3454  1.60827  0.2004  3454  2.89532  0.0554 
MOVE --> FSI  5081  3.8091  0.0222  4563  10.2206  0.00004  4563  10.6479  0.00002  4563  5.59973  0.0037 
VDAX --> FSI  5013  3.50828  0.03  4495  3.11038  0.0447  4495  1.91592  0.1473  4495  2.34411  0.096 
VIX --> FSI  5081  5.97135  0.0026  4563  11.4408  0.00001  4563  9.52589  0.00007  4563  7.19877  0.0008 
†† – indicates one-way Granger causality with 79 percent or better confidence. † – indicates consistent one-way 
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Table 18 
Systemic stress episode identification via volatility benchmarks (discrimination threshold θ = 1std). 
START  END  SSE  SYSTEMIC STRESS IDENTIFICATION  TYPE  VIX θ  MOVE θ  VDAX θ  BOX θ 
8/19/1991  9/16/1991  1  Eastern European shocks  FOR  1.8  2.3 
9/30/1991 11/18/1991  2  Bond  Markets  Shock  FIN  1.5  2.2 
11/25/1991  1/6/1992  2  Scandinavian Crisis  FOR  4.5  1.8 
1/13/1992  6/1/1992  2  RE Credit Crunch  FIN  1.9  6.0 
7/6/1992 12/21/1992  3  ERM  Crisis  FIN  1.5  1.4 
1/4/1993  4/12/1993 4  N/A  N/A  1.6 1.5 - 
4/26/1993 6/14/1993  5  N/A  N/A  2.2  1.5 
7/5/1993  9/20/1993  6  IMF Warning (Russian crisis/Global Bond Markets Reversal)  FIN  1.5  1.8 
9/27/1993  12/26/1994  6  Bond Market Crisis  FIN  2.3  2.3  2.5 
1/9/1995  1/30/1995  7  Bond Market Crisis  FIN  1.2 
3/6/1995 3/13/1995  8  Mexican  Crisis  FIN  4.4 
4/3/1995  6/26/1995 9  Mexican  Crisis  FIN  3.2 1.8 2.9 
7/3/1995  9/11/1995  9  Japanese Bank Runs / Withdrawal from U.S.D Assets  FIN  1.3  3.9  1.2 
9/18/1995  12/25/1995  9  Daiwa Bank Bond Trading Loss / U.S. Budget Congressional Standoff  FIN  2.4  1.4 
1/1/1996  7/1/1996  9  Inflation worries / Fed signals end of interest rate cuts  FIN  2.0  1.7 
7/15/1996  7/7/1997  10  “Irrational exuberance” volatility  FIN  4.1  2.2  3.8  2.2 
7/14/1997  9/22/1997  10  Concurrent U.S. & German equity shocks  FIN  2.2  4.7  3.2 
9/29/1997  12/8/1997 10  Asian  Crisis  FIN  1.9 1.9 1.4 2.1 
12/15/1997 3/2/1998  10  Asian  Crisis  FIN  4.4 2.2 2.7 2.7 
3/30/1998 7/13/1998  11  Asian  Crisis  N/A  2.8  -  2.0 
7/20/1998 3/29/1999  11  LTCM  Crisis  FIN  1.5  1.2 
4/19/1999 4/19/1999  12  LTCM  Crisis  N/A  1.3 
5/3/1999 7/19/1999  13  Brazil  Crisis  FIN  1.3  1.6 
7/26/1999  8/23/1999  13  International aftershocks (Latin America and Asia)  FIN  1.8  2.9  2.7  3.8 
8/30/1999  11/8/1999  13  Y2K anxiety (Credit insurance shocks)  FIN  1.5  2.9  1.6  4.4 
11/22/1999 3/27/2000 14  Dot-com  Crisis  FIN  -  1.2 
4/10/2000  6/12/2000 15  Dot-com  Crisis  FIN  5.5 3.4 1.8 
7/3/2000 2/19/2001  16  Dot-com  Crisis  FIN  1.4  2.4 
3/12/2001  8/27/2001  17  Early 2000s Recession  FOR  3.4  3.7  2.3  3.8 
9/3/2001  2/18/2002  17  Terrorist attacks  NONFIN  3.1  2.0  4.6  4.0 
3/11/2002  12/2/2002  18  Stock Market Downturn  FIN  1.7 
12/16/2002  3/3/2003  19  Stock Market Downturn  FIN  -  1.6 
3/10/2003  4/7/2003  19  Iraq War  NONFIN  2.4  2.3  1.4 
6/23/2003 11/17/2003  20  Treasury  Correction  FIN  - 
2/2/2004  2/2/2004  21  US Presidential Campaign Stress  NONFIN  1.8  2.5  - 
3/15/2004  4/5/2004  22  Terrorist Attacks in Spain  NONFIN  3.7  2.1 
3/29/2004  6/21/2004  22  Interest Rate Shock  FIN  1.8  2.5  2.3  1.8 
7/5/2004  8/30/2004  23  Energy Expectations Shock  FIN  1.9  1.2 
9/27/2004  11/1/2004  24  Fannie Mae Crisis (Capital Injection)  FIN  1.2  3.7 
1/3/2005  1/24/2005  25  Contraction in Foreign Capital Flows / Republicans Win Election  FIN  2.1  2.2  - 
2/28/2005  8/15/2005  26  Combined Equity and Energy Price Shocks  FIN  -  2.7 
8/22/2005  8/29/2005  26  Hurricane Katrina / Energy Price Shock  NONFIN  2.2  3.4 
9/5/2005  11/14/2005  26  Equity Expectations Shock  FIN  1.5  2.1  2.9  3.2 
11/21/2005  8/21/2006  26  Housing Correction Fears / Inflation Expectations  FIN  1.8  5.2 
8/28/2006 2/19/2007  26  Amaranth  Collapse  FIN  1.2  1.4  1.6 
1/1/2007  7/16/2007  26  Subprime Industry collapse domino  FIN  3.3  3.4  2.2 
2/26/2007  4/2/2007  26  Chinese  Correction  FIN  9.4 3.6 4.2 
7/23/2007  3/24/2008 26  Subprime  Crisis  FIN  6.5 4.3 6.0 7.6 
12/3/2007  4/21/2008  26  Late 2000s Recession  FIN  2.2  4.4  4.3 
6/9/2008  3/30/2009  27  US Bear Market  FIN  1.4  1.9  1.4  2.1 
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Fig. 18 (cont’d). Financial Systemic Stress Episodes: Quarterly Dependent Variable vs. High-Frequency FSI. 
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